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ABSTRACT

Homebuilt aircraft have a high accident rate during the flight test period, particularly
during their first and second flights. For the 2002-2004 period, over 1.0% of homebuilt
aircraft were involved in an accident on their first flight, and 3.3% were involved in
accidents in the first 40 hours of operation. Untrained, low time in aircraft type amateur
flight test participants, unorthodox flight test procedures, and lack of clear guidance as to
who should and how to conduct safe and effective flight test lead to unsafe conditions
and the accident statistics support this hypothesis. In the accidents analyzed, lack of
experience was specifically cited by the NTSB as a causal factor in 15.6% of the
accidents. Poor decision-making was also a common thread, with 15.6% involving faulty
decision-making by the pilot-builder. Shappell and Wiegmann’s Human Factors Analysis
and Classification System (HFACS) is applied to interpret the statistics and the model is
applied to the current state of homebuilt flight test in comparison to professional flight
test. Detailed comparison is made between amateur and professional flight test practices
and case studies are provided to support the analysis. The author proposes that ideally,
flight test is left to trained professionals. The training, experience, and support structure
of professional testers and their organizations can effectively mitigate the lack of time in
type and training characteristic of the typical homebuilt flight tester. Accepting that this is
not always practical in the homebuilt flight test world, it is recommended that
professional practices be applied to amateur flight testing. Furthermore, it is suggested
that the guidance available to amateur flight testers be improved and that regulations
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require that the homebuilder meet with an FAA-designated engineering representative
regarding the conduct of flight test.
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INTRODUCTION

Expertise in an aircraft’s handling, performance, and systems is essential to flying it with
precision and preventing an accident in the case of an emergency by breaking the chain
of causal events. It is for that reason that advanced aircraft require specific type ratings to
ensure that the cockpit crew is intimate with the aircraft. The opposite is borne out by
statistics that show that pilots with low time in type are more likely to be involved in an
accident than those with extensive experience in the type of aircraft. It is not likely that
the low time in type pilot simply loses control of the aircraft or otherwise directly causes
the accident under normal operating conditions. More likely, the pilot who is
unaccustomed to the aircraft that he is flying has difficultly coping with a developing
emergency situation. Unfamiliar with the aircraft’s handling and systems, he is more
likely to make a mistake or simply not act in time to avoid the accident. In effect, a low
time in type pilot becomes a test pilot in an emergency – he is suddenly flying an
unknown aircraft with unknown characteristics. Professional test pilots mitigate the risks
associated with flying in these conditions through extensive training and, in general, large
amounts of overall experience. Both of these factors not only offset the risks associated
with flying an unknown aircraft, but also allow the test pilot to fly with the necessary
precision to perform his primary mission – to collect accurate data and evaluate the
aircraft.

Unfortunately, in the world of homebuilt aircraft, the tendency is to place untrained, low
time in type pilots in the aircraft during the flight test process, resulting in a high accident
1

rate and questionable flight test results. These low time in type pilots are more prone to
accidents due primarily to human factors. These factors are not limited to pilot behavior
in the cockpit, but rather span the entire continuum of potential failures that can lead to
an accident. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) statistics [1-10] and Shappell
and Wiegmann’s Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) model for
human factors causes [11] as well as several case studies illustrate the weaknesses in the
current state of homebuilt flight testing. The elements of the HFACS also highlight the
methods by which professional flight testers overcome the very same challenges.

The fundamental issue is that homebuilt aircraft have a high accident rate during the
flight test period, particularly during their first flights. Untrained, low time in aircraft type
amateur flight test participants, unorthodox flight test procedures, and lack of clear
guidance as to who should and how to conduct safe and effective flight test lead to unsafe
conditions which not only provide a fertile breeding ground for emergency situations to
develop, but also tend to exacerbate these emergencies and lead to accidents. Accident
statistics support this hypothesis. In this analysis, the HFACS is applied to interpret the
statistics and analyze the status quo. Within this context, a detailed comparison is made
between amateur and professional flight test practices in an effort to develop solutions to
this problem.

2

CHAPTER 1 - BACKGROUND

SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE

Unfortunately, only a limited amount of information regarding flight testing is available
to members of the general public. Most of the publications available are military
publications which, although not classified, are in limited distribution. Persistent
members of the public can, at the very least, often obtain outdated copies of these
documents. In addition to the military publications, a few texts have been published about
flight testing. Two of the most common texts, by Sonja Englert [12] and Vaughan Askue
[13], are specifically about flight testing homebuilt aircraft and another, Ward and
Strganac’s text about flight test engineering [14], is often used as a university text on the
subject. The most common reference used by homebuilt flight testers is the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) Advisory Circular (AC) which specifically addresses the
subject, AC90-89A [15]. Also available is an advisory circular which outlines test
techniques used to satisfy the regulations regarding the certification of certified aircraft,
AC23-8B [16]. This document also contains information relevant to homebuilt flight
testing. FAA Order 8130.2F [17] addresses airworthiness certification of aircraft and
specifically outlines the limitations imposed on experimental amateur-built aircraft
during the flight test period. Following is a partial listing of the literature available
regarding flight testing and homebuilt aircraft:

3

U.S. Naval Test Pilot School Flight Test Manual USNTPS-FTM-No. 103, Fixed Wing
Stability and Control [18]

FTM-103 [18] is one of the primary texts used by students at the U.S. Naval Test Pilot
School (USNTPS) at NAS Patuxent River, Maryland. It covers both the theory and flight
test techniques used by naval aviators and flight test engineers (FTEs) in the testing of
fixed wing aircraft stability and control and handling qualities, although the theory is
provided primarily as a reference and is covered more extensively in other texts. U.S.
Navy flight test personnel often use this text as their primary flight test reference
following graduation. A similar publication, FTM-107 [19], covers rotary wing stability
and control flight test. Other test pilot schools, including the U.S. Air Force Test Pilot
School (USAFTPS) and the civilian National Test Pilot School (NTPS) in Mojave, CA,
have similar publications.

U.S. Naval Test Pilot School Flight Test Manual USNTPS-FTM-No. 108, Fixed Wing
Performance [20]

FTM-108 [20] is the other primary text used by students at the U.S. Naval Test Pilot
School. Similar in presentation to FTM-103 [18], FTM-108 covers both the theory and
flight test techniques used by naval aviators and flight test engineers in the testing of
fixed wing aircraft performance characteristics. Again, the theory is provided primarily as
a reference and is covered more extensively in other texts. Much as with FTM-103, U.S.
Navy flight test personnel often use this text as a reference following graduation. A
4

similar publication, FTM-106 [21], covers rotary wing stability and control flight test.
Other test pilot schools have similar publications.

NAVAIR Instruction 3960.4A, Project Test Plan Policy and Process for Testing Air
Vehicles, Weapons, and Installed Systems [22]

The Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) Test Plan Instruction [22], as it is known,
is an internal U.S. Navy document. It is not classified and can be obtained through opensource methods. NAVAIR 3960.4A outlines the policies, processes, and team member
responsibilities associated with U.S. Navy flight test programs. It is an excellent example
of the guidance provided by management to flight test teams in large organizations.

FAA Order 8130.2F, Airworthiness Certification of Aircraft and Related Products [17]

Several sections of FAA Order 8130.2F [17] pertain to the certification of experimental
category aircraft. Of the greatest interest to homebuilt flight testers is the section that
defines the flight test period (the 25- and 40- hour rule) and the limitations imposed on
the operation of the aircraft therein. Described within this document are FAA procedures
for experimental aircraft certification, evaluation, and issuance of operating limitations.

Code of Federal Regulations 14 CFR Part 91, General Operating and Flight Rules [23]
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Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) Part 91 specifically addresses aircraft with
experimental certificates in Part 91.319 [23]. This section addresses the flight test period
and the operation of experimental certificated aircraft for hire.

FAA Advisory Circular AC90-89A, Amateur-Built Aircraft and Ultralight Flight Testing
Handbook [15]

AC90-89A [15] outlines a comprehensive flight test program and provides guidance to
homebuilders regarding the conduct of flight test. Unfortunately, this document is poorly
organized and often provides, in the author’s opinion, poor guidance. For example, it
begins with a 2-paragraph section on test planning and then moves on to a lengthy
discussion of the selection of the airport from which to conduct flight test, implying that
this is the most important aspect of the flight test program. Not until the fourth section
does it address the test pilot, and then it provides extremely low suggested test pilot flight
time requirements. The comprehensive test program suggested is a “one-size-fits-all”
approach to flight test and does not address the need to focus on different areas of flight
test depending on whether the aircraft being tested is a kitplane, plans-built aircraft, or
one-of-a-kind design.

FAA AC23-8B, Flight Test Guide for Certification of Part 23 Airplanes [16]

AC23-8B [16] is the companion to FAR Part 23 [24], which governs the certification of
most general aviation aircraft. This flight test guide describes the typical flight test
6

methods used to obtain the data required by FAR Part 23. It is very useful to
homebuilders as it shows many of the data reduction techniques and plotting tools that
are used by professional flight testers to organize flight test results and synthesize the
information into a useful format. Furthermore, it directly connects flight test techniques
with data collection objectives.

Homebuilt Aerodynamics and Flight Testing, Sonja Englert [12]

Sonja Englert’s text [12] is commercially available and is a fairly comprehensive guide to
both the theory and practice of flight testing. The theory is presented at a level that is
appropriate for the average homebuilder. Test methods are clearly presented and
specifically tailored for light, piston-engine single flight testing. Each test method is
described in detail and accompanied by example test cards which outline the data to be
collected. Instructions on how to reduce the data and interpret the results are also
included. The text’s primary weakness is that it does not substantively address test team
members and their qualifications.

Flight Testing Homebuilt Aircraft, Vaughan Askue [13]

Askue’s text begins with the words “Test Pilot” in enormous font. What follows is a
description how real test pilots are highly-trained professionals and not the mythological
archetypes portrayed in Hollywood movies. He then proceeds to say that amateurs, with
“a few basic methods and techniques” can properly flight test their aircraft. Later, he
7

suggests rather casually that it is not just possible, but desirable, for the builder to fly the
tests (including first flight) himself. The bulk of the text is presented as a series of short
sections addressing each test item, some of which are detailed and others which do not
fully explain test methods, data collection, and data reduction. Each section is followed
by suggestions for further reading.

Kitplane Construction, Ronald J. Wanttaja [25]

Wanttaja’s text [25] is extremely popular with homebuilders and focuses primarily on
construction of the aircraft. He provides an excellent history of the homebuilt aircraft
industry and detailed information on aircraft selection, powerplant selection, construction
techniques, and avionics selection. With respect to flight testing, Wanttaja discusses pilot
preparation and suggests letting a pilot experienced in the aircraft type perform the first
flight.

Introductions to Flight Test Engineering Volume One by Donald T. Ward, Thomas W.
Strganac, Rob Niewoehner (formerly Introduction to Flight Test Engineering by Ward
and Strganac) [14]

Recently revised, Ward and Strganac’s text [14] is commonly used as a text in university
flight test engineering courses. It describes data collection and reduction in detail and
provides appropriately advanced mathematics. As a result, it is to a great degree above
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the average homebuilder’s level of comprehension and is useful primarily to those who
want a deeper understanding of flight test engineering.

Understanding Performance Flight Testing: Kitplanes and Production Aircraft by Hubert
C. Smith [26]

Smith’s text [26] is dedicated to performance testing, but includes in its introduction
some general information on flight testing in general. He includes test and data reduction
methods for the full range of performance tests. Also included is a disk of Microsoft
Excel worksheets developed for data reduction. The text describes how a homebuilder
can develop performance charts that are similar to those found in the pilot’s operating
handbooks of certified aircraft.

Introduction to Aircraft Flight Test Engineering by Hubert C. Smith [27]

Used as a university-level text on flight test, Smith’s text [27] describes data collection
and reduction in a manner similar to Ward and Strganac. Also similarly, it is generally
above the average homebuilder’s level of comprehension.

Society of Flight Test Engineers Reference Handbook [28]

9

Distributed only to members of the Society of Flight Test Engineers (SFTE), a
professional society for FTEs, the SFTE Handbook [28] provides basic theory and
standard calculations typically used during flight test planning and data reduction.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF HOMEBUILT AIRCRAFT

Throughout this paper, the author has used the terms homebuilt, kitplane, and
experimental aircraft somewhat interchangeably. The first term, homebuilt, encompasses
all aircraft that are built by individuals rather than manufactured by a corporation for
commercial purposes. “Kitplane” refers more specifically to a homebuilt aircraft that is
sold as a kit for assembly by the individual. Even this term is broad, as kitplanes come in
many varieties. Some kitplanes come in thousands of small pieces, requiring the builder
to construct nearly every subassembly of the aircraft. Some parts may require holes
drilled or shaping. Others may have all parts pre-cut and ready to assemble and still
others, often known as fast-build or quickbuild kits, come with large portions of the
aircraft

pre-assembled,

requiring

only

large-scale

mating

of

subassemblies.

“Experimental aircraft” are an even broader group that includes all aircraft certified in the
Experimental category. This includes all homebuilts, as well as many warbirds and
prototype commercially manufactured aircraft. The term “plans-built” refers to a
homebuilt that is built from scratch from plans only. The builder must manufacture or
purchase every part of the aircraft himself.
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Homebuilt aircraft date back to the origins of powered flight. Prior to World War I, all
aircraft were homebuilts. Even in factories, the aircraft were hand built, and plans for
production aircraft were readily available. As a result, people not associated with the
manufacturer could build the aircraft themselves [25]. The first kitplane was the Heath
Parasol, which emerged in the late 1920s in response to the growing cost of production
aircraft. Kitplane production grew substantially after 1947, when the amateur-built
category was introduced [25].

Much of the popularity of homebuilt aircraft can be attributed to the advantages offered
by the Experimental category. The homebuilder can essentially do whatever he wishes to
his aircraft. He can install any engine, any type of avionics, or any airframe modification
that he desires. He can also perform all of his own maintenance, saving thousands of
dollars per year. Also enticing to the homebuilder is the breadth of aircraft choices
available at a given price point. If one has $150,000 to spend on a four-seat airplane, the
certified world offers only used aircraft. Most, if not all, of these choices will be over 20
years old and based on even older designs. For that same amount of money (albeit with a
great deal more time and effort), the builder can have a brand new homebuilt aircraft
configured as he wishes.

Perhaps the most appealing aspect of homebuilt aircraft is also their greatest weakness.
Unencumbered by the Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) Part 23 (airworthiness
standards for normal, utility, acrobatic, and commuter category airplanes [24]) that
certified aircraft must satisfy, designers of homebuilt aircraft can achieve superior
11

performance than their certified counterparts. This is accomplished through design
tradeoffs, such as trading reduced stability for increased maneuverability. Just as fighter
aircraft are designed with relaxed stability so that they can be easily maneuvered, the
homebuilt designer can choose to relax his aircraft’s stability to improve its
maneuverability, as he does not have to meet the regulations in FAR Part 23, which state
that certified GA aircraft must demonstrate positive stability. Likewise, the homebuilt
aircraft can be designed with a very sleek laminar flow wing that allows for blistering
speed at the cost of higher stall speed and poor stall warning. [25] The result is that many
homebuilts are faster and more maneuverable than similar certified aircraft while
simultaneously being more difficult to fly and, most importantly, less forgiving of poor
pilot technique or pilot error.

All told, the general decline of the GA manufacturing industry after 1980 and the above
factors have accounted for a general increase in the popularity of homebuilt aircraft [29].
From 1993 to 1999, the FAA reported a 585% increase in the estimated number of active
amateur-built aircraft and a 218% increase in the estimated number of annual flight hours
for amateur-built aircraft [8]. By 2007, the Experimental Aircraft Association (EAA)
reported that, “amateur-built aircraft have come to comprise over 15% of the registered
U.S. civil, single-engine general aviation fleet” [30].
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CHAPTER 2 - THE STATE OF HOMEBUILT FLIGHT TEST

WEAKNESSES IN THE GUIDANCE CURRENTLY AVAILABLE TO
HOMEBUILDERS

The aforementioned growth in the homebuilt aircraft segment has, of course, resulted in a
corresponding increase in the number of homebuilts being tested and operated. Accident
statistics, described in greater detail later in this chapter, show that homebuilt aircraft are
involved in a greater number of accidents than similar certified aircraft. Moreover,
homebuilt aircraft have a very high accident rate during their first 25 to 40 hour flight test
period. There are several probable causes for this trend. The majority of the pilots
conducting these test flights have received limited and unclear guidance as to how to
conduct flight test. Complicating this situation is that the sources of this guidance are
somewhat disparate. Of equal importance is that these pilots tend to have no training as
test pilots and have low time in aircraft type.

The first problem that the homebuilder faces when approaching flight test is basic
guidance. Unlike building techniques, about which countless books, magazine articles
and websites exist, little guidance is available to the homebuilder with regard to flight
test. Even the answer to the most basic question that the homebuilder might ask, “what is
the main objective of flight testing my aircraft?” is not readily available. In a perfect
world, the objective of homebuilt flight test would be based on the type of aircraft being
tested. There are vast differences between a docile, mass-produced kitplane such as the
13

Van’s RV-6, and complex, ultra high performance kitplanes such as the Lancair IV-P,
and plans-built scale warbirds. It would be shortsighted and perhaps irresponsible to paint
the canvas of homebuilt flight test with a broad brush, but unfortunately that is exactly
what much of the guidance available to homebuilders does.

If one follows AC90-89A [15], the primary homebuilt flight test guidance resource
available from the FAA, one will easily fill a 25-hour flight test period with a very
comprehensive series of tests. Engine runs, fuel flow and usable fuel tests, in-depth
propeller inspections, and logical low-speed taxi, high-speed taxi, and first flight tests are
prescribed. These detailed suggestions are very similar to the procedures followed in
commercial and military flight test and are appropriate for all aircraft. The AC90-89A,
however, then recommends fifteen hours of dedicated stability and control tests.

An airplane such as a Glasair or (Van’s) RV, representative of a type of aircraft that is
widely produced and has, to at least some extent, known flying qualities, probably does
not require this large amount of stability and control testing. Characterization of the
flying qualities and stability of the aircraft might be interesting, but, if the aircraft is
typical of a type, not necessary. Rather, a more appropriate goal would be to confirm that
the aircraft behaves in a manner similar to other aircraft of the type and to characterize
any situations where it does not. With that objective, the flight test of such an aircraft
would far more closely resemble the production flight test that is conducted by certified
aircraft manufacturers. The primary goal of this type of flight test program is
confirmation that the aircraft has been constructed properly, meets expected performance
14

and handling standards, and is safe. In such a case, it is acceptable to examine the
aircraft’s flying qualities at a selected small group of points within the aircraft’s flight
envelope. Testing should always be performed in accordance with accepted test
methodology and as precisely as possible, but need not be performed to the kind of
“resolution” suggested in the available resources with respect to the number of flight
conditions at which testing is conducted. Flight regimes where behavior is nonlinear
should be examined closely, but in other parts of the envelope testing of the “endpoints”
might be adequate.

The opposite case is true with a plans-built airplane, original design, or highly modified
kit aircraft. In this situation, a comprehensive flight test program is in order. Unlike a
standard, commercially available kitplane, nearly all characteristics of this type of aircraft
will be unknown. In addition to confirming that the aircraft has been constructed in a
proper manner, the flight test program must confirm, for example, that, to use the
terminology of FAR 91.319 [23], that the aircraft is controllable throughout the normal
range of speeds. In this case, the “resolution” with respect to the number of flight
conditions at which testing is conducted must be very high so as to avoid overlooking a
portion of the envelope where flying qualities or performance aspects are nonlinear and
therefore not easily extrapolated. With these types of homebuilts, the goal is to actually
define the aircraft’s behavior and performance and the aircraft must be considered
completely unknown. Furthermore, major deficiencies may be discovered, such as
dangerous stall characteristics in a specific configuration. The testers then must decide
how to address these deficiencies. Solutions could range from a recommendation to avoid
15

a specific flight regime to the addition of aerodynamic devices such as vortex generators
to, in extreme cases, wholesale design changes. Thus, the test program will more closely
resemble a developmental test program, where characteristics are defined and design
deficiencies resolved, than a production test program where defects are identified and
corrected.

In many cases, the actual flight test program will lie somewhere in between these
aforementioned extremes. Flight test of homebuilts should be viewed as a continuum.
Few mass-produced kitplanes are constructed without some significant modifications,
and most of them incorporate avionics and instrumentation that require more than cursory
flight test, such as electronic flight information system (EFIS) units that are marketed
solely to homebuilders and therefore themselves not subject to FAA certification.
Likewise, in the case of a plans-built aircraft, it is likely that there are several examples of
the aircraft already flying. This at least gives the tester some idea as to what to expect
from the aircraft. Of course, it is far safer to expand the testing of a commercially
available kitplane than it is to omit tests from the testing of a plan-built aircraft.

The FAA regulations and AC90-89A [15], unfortunately perhaps, conflict with this
philosophy. By requiring a 25 to 40-hour test period, the FAA implies that all homebuilts
require a great deal of flight test. AC90-89A corroborates this implication, as it dutifully
prescribes just that – 25 to 40 hours worth of comprehensive flight test. More appropriate
than this monolithic approach would be a requirement for an educated, well-developed
test program that is appropriate to the specific aircraft under investigation to be
16

implemented. Boeing does not re-fly the entire matrix of FAA certification tests on every
737 that comes off the assembly line, so why should the builder of a Lancair IV, who has
utilized the company’s extensive builder assistance program, have to fly tests that are
actually developmental in nature rather than production-type tests?

Many factors must be considered, however, when proposing to customize flight test for
homebuilt aircraft. One factor is the level of quality control in both the kit construction
and assembly (one reason that Boeing does not have to fly the entire matrix of FAA
certification tests on every 737 that comes off the assembly line is because they have a
great deal of confidence that that airplane is very nearly identical to the one(s) flown for
certification). Quality control varies from company to company and certainly from
builder to builder. One anecdotal account tells of a builder who simply forgot to install
the bolts that connected the wings of his airplane to the fuselage. The skin and paint were
sufficient to hold the wings in place during ground tests, but once the airplane was in the
air and the wings loaded, they separated from the aircraft (with predictably catastrophic
results). A proposed solution to these problems is discussed in Chapter 6.

The most disconcerting aspect of the current guidance available to homebuilders, and
consequently throughout the culture of homebuilt flight testing, is the prevailing attitude
toward test piloting. The available guidance is not only lacking in that it fails to address
the aforementioned breadth of flight test, it also tends to push homebuilders toward
conducting the tests themselves. In addition, the available texts and resources provide
incomplete guidance as to how to conduct safe and effective flight test. All of the popular
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references for homebuilders address in some manner the abilities and preparation of the
test pilot, but they all take a very cavalier approach toward them.

AC90-89A [15] clearly leads builders toward performing their own flight testing. The AC
provides some recommendations as to test pilot qualifications, but the minimal amount of
experience recommended – 100 hours solo time before flight testing a kit plane or an
aircraft built from a time-proven set of plans or 200 hours solo time before flight testing
for a ‘‘one of a kind’’ or a high performance aircraft [15] would barely qualify a
commercially rated pilot to tow a banner. AC90-89A entirely ignores the possibility that
a pilot who has flown only one or two different aircraft types, and likely has never
experienced anything other than a simulated engine failure and private-pilot style unusual
attitude recoveries, may not have the requisite skills to perform flight testing. The AC
makes no mention of control system failures or recovery from out-of-control flight – both
of which are situations that the pilot of an aircraft on its first flight might encounter.
AC90-89A dedicates more text to aeromedical factors than it does to test pilot credentials
and experience.

In her book Homebuilt Aerodynamics and Flight Testing [12], Sonja Englert dedicates
only two vague sentences to test pilot qualifications. “The first flight should be done by
you only if you have enough recent flying experience and preferably some time in type.
Otherwise, it is a lot more prudent to leave it to someone qualified for it” [12]. Readers of
this reference will likely refer back to AC90-89A [15], as it provides some quantitative
information. Once again, the text does not address control system failures or recovery
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from out-of-control flight. Although Englert is correct to suggest that the pilot have some
time in type, this may be difficult for the builder of an unusual or unique design. No
further discussion is provided to assist the reader in understanding the influence of time
in type on accident rates and factors mitigating this influence, which are addressed in
detail in Chapter 3.

Vaughn Askue’s Flight Testing Homebuilt Aircraft [13] is one of the most popular
resources for homebuilders and dedicates nearly two pages to test pilot flying skills and
mental attitude. As for the decision to test fly the aircraft oneself or to find a more
qualified test pilot, Askue states that, “To answer this you must review your experience
and compare it with the probable characteristics of the airplane you’ve built” [13]. There
is no discussion as to what actually qualifies someone to act as a test pilot. The last
sentence of the paragraph has a somewhat sinister undertone, “If you do get someone to
do your flying, remember that it’s your airplane and the pilot must fly it the way you
want it flown” [13]. The way that this sentence is written appears to suggest that it is
better to test fly one’s own aircraft than let someone else do it. Furthermore, it implies
that the builder is the best qualified to determine how an airplane should be flight tested.
This is a preposterous concept, considering that there are accepted industry standards and
doctrine regarding flight test. If the builder was actually best qualified to test fly an
aircraft, why would manufacturers maintain staffs of test pilots and flight test engineers?
Why would the military invest millions of dollars each year in the training of these
personnel? Askue’s attitude is particularly disturbing considering that he works for a
large airframe manufacturer and is a former flight test engineer himself.
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Askue’s statements in the paragraphs following the one quoted above confirm his
cavalier attitude:

If you have decided to [test fly your airplane] yourself it is time to brush up on your
basic skills … If there are no taildraggers available and yours is, it is worth a trip to
shoot some landings in an airplane with the little wheel on the back end.
In your practice flying, emphasize steep turns and spins if the airplane can do
them. You should be striving to fly the airplane as accurately as possible. Now do
some takeoffs, full-stop landings, and go-arounds. Again, emphasize precise airspeed
control and accurate patterns [13].

This guidance is somewhat ridiculous. The idea that it is simply a nice idea to get
tailwheel experience prior to the first flight of a tailwheel airplane is a severe and
dangerous understatement. Even more dangerous is his statement regarding the emphasis
on performing “steep turns and spins if the airplane can do them.” What if the airplane
that the potential test pilot is practicing in cannot safely perform steep turns and spins? It
is inconceivable that a pilot might conduct a first flight without having practiced
necessary maneuvers. Flying the plane “as accurately as possible” is also quite an
understatement, considering that Askue dedicates the rest of the book to precision flying,
data collection, and data reduction. Without precision flying, accurate data collection is
impossible. Perhaps most telling is the casual tone in Askue’s writing. He writes about
one of aviation’s most dangerous activities as one would expect a magazine writer to
write about a pilot preparing for the first flight of the summer in his Aeronca Champ with
the doors removed.
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The reason for the prevalence of the attitude that homebuilt flight test should be
conducted by the builder is not well-defined. One reason may be simply that, to date, the
majority of homebuilt flight test is performed by the builder, and none of the authors of
the above references have the goal of changing the status quo. Most disturbing is that
none of the sources ask the potential amateur test pilot to compare his skills and abilities
to that of the true standard – the professional test pilot. It would seem logical that if one
were to embark on a hazardous endeavor that, far from being arcane and mysterious, is
well-defined and performed by numerous professionals on a daily basis, one would at the
very least examine their training and skill set to gain a general understanding of what
might be required to perform such an endeavor. Another problem is that many builders
consider the first flight as simply part of the building process. It is considered the
capstone of the project and a source of great pride for the builder. Indeed, in many cases,
against the advice published in some of the resources and certainly opposed to the normal
practices of professional testers, builders invite friends and family to observe the first
flight of their aircraft. Ego likely plays a prominent role in the decision to test one’s own
airplane. It is not easy for someone to go to their EAA meeting, packed with other pilots
who performed their own flight tests, and admit that you do not have the “courage” to do
it yourself. It is also an opportunity for the average private pilot to play test pilot. Many
in the aviation community consider test pilots like Chuck Yeager and Scott Crossfield to
be their heroes, and the opportunity to be like them is captivating. Finally, there is an
element of ignorance. Although, as previously mentioned, the field of flight test is welldefined and performed by numerous professionals on a daily basis, its details are not well
known by the average pilot. Many believe that test pilots merely “kick the tires and light
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the fires” and do not understand the training, precision, and patience involved. A small
amount of research would reveal the true nature of flight test, but consider the average
homebuilder’s experience. He spends months or years researching the aircraft that he
wants to build, then years actually doing so. Along the way, he researches building
techniques, materials, tooling, and parts. The first flight of the aircraft seems like a distant
event, so research regarding flight test is a low priority. Throughout the process,
however, the builder’s peers are likely passively, but negatively, influencing his
understanding of the requirements of flight test as described above.

Regardless of the reasons for the trend toward builders conducting their own flight tests,
the status quo is such that most builders do so, and most of these builders are ill prepared
to act as test pilots. In addition to the aforementioned deficiencies in the guidance
available to builders regarding flight test, few have an appropriate amount or applicable
type of experience. Whereas the average military test pilot enters test pilot school with
over 1000 hours as pilot in command of high performance aircraft and graduates a year
later with extensive classroom training and having flown a dozen different aircraft of
widely varying types (high-performance jets, multiengine turboprops, light single engine
pistons, and warbirds), the typical homebuilder has never even simulated precision flight
for the purposes of data collection or an out of control flight condition. Furthermore, he
has likely only flown a few types of general aviation (GA) aircraft in his flying career and
even fewer types to a high level of proficiency or with extreme attention to detail. The
lack of homebuilders’ relevant experience and the effect of this phenomenon are
examined further in Chapter 3.
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As previously mentioned and examined in greater detail in Chapter 3, the statistics
support the hypothesis that this combination of piecemeal, poorly-targeted, and often
inappropriate guidance has a negative impact on the risks associated with testing
homebuilt aircraft. This fact has not gone unnoticed by the Experimental Aircraft
Association, the largest organization of homebuilders and homebuilt aircraft enthusiasts.
One of the EAA’s publications, Sport Aviation magazine, routinely publishes articles on
homebuilt safety. More significantly, the EAA has established what is known as the
Flight Advisor program. This program matches builders with an EAA volunteer who
helps the builder evaluate his own flying skills for the purpose of determining if they are
ready to perform the first flight of their aircraft. The flight advisor does not actually
evaluate the builder, but serves rather as an experienced sounding board that the builder
can use to help him perform a self-evaluation [31].

Although the Flight Advisor Program is an unequivocally positive effort, it has its
limitations. Flight Advisors are volunteers, and although the EAA requires that they meet
certain experience requirements (described below), they are not trained, professional
testers. Their advice is also subject to very limited oversight, so there are no guarantees
that Flight Advisors will not give advice that exceeds their level of knowledge or violates
their mission statement. The EAA’s experience requirements are listed below:
To qualify to become an EAA Flight Advisor, you must be a current member of EAA
and conform to any one of the following experience measures:
• First flights or test flown three or more aircraft (homebuilt, restoration or
ultralight).
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•

•

•

•

Built/restored and test flew own aircraft and
- is a Technical Counselor with significant flight test experience
- or has significant experience in requested specialty, i.e., homebuilts, vintage
and more than 1,000 hours pilot in command (PIC) time.
Built and test flew own ultralight and
- is a Technical Counselor with significant flight test experience
- or has more than 300 hours in ultralights
Air transport pilot (ATP)/certificated flight instructor (CFI) with significant
"show plane" experience, i.e., vintage, homebuilt, and more than 1,000 hours
pilot in command PIC.
Military flight test experience with "show plane" experience, i.e., vintage,
homebuilt, ultralight and more than 1,000 hours PIC

Source: EAA [31].

Although these requirements are generally strong, they nevertheless have some
weaknesses. For example, the first experience requirement of having accomplished first
flights or test flown three or more aircraft is somewhat vague. A pilot can claim this
experience after simply flying three undemanding level flight performance flights that did
not even yield any usable data. Furthermore, a pilot is not a qualified test pilot simply
because he survives three first flights. Many first flights are uneventful, and thereby
provide the pilot with only a limited amount of useful “flight test” experience. Again, the
act of flying the first flight is not itself conducting flight test. Flight test is the overall
experience of planning the flight, flying the flight, maneuvering the aircraft with the
required precision, observing the aircraft’s behavior critically, and reporting the results,
even if that report is limited to entering accurate data into one’s own pilot’s operating
handbook (POH).
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PROFESSIONAL FLIGHT TEST RESOURCES AVAILABLE TO HOMEBUILDERS

In light of the serious nature of flight testing, one would expect that the homebuilt
aviation world would be awash in professional flight testers. Unfortunately, as mentioned
earlier, the current state of the homebuilt flight test industry is one characterized
primarily by a “do-it-yourself” attitude. It is actually fairly difficult for the average
builder to locate a professional test pilot or flight test service. An internet search of the
terms “homebuilt flight test” results in a long list of places to purchase the
aforementioned books on the subject, but only one individual who lists flight testing as
one of his services, and even that seems an afterthought.

In spite of the difficulties in locating them, there are individuals and companies who
perform flight test of homebuilt aircraft for hire. The majority of the individuals are
experienced professional (CFI, corporate, or commercial) pilots who also have
considerable time in homebuilt aircraft. Few have any formal flight test training and
many have learned what they know of flight test doctrine from Askue and Englert’s texts
[13, 12]. Virtually all of them work alone and approach the flight test exclusively from
the pilot’s point of view. Similarly, few of them are engineers themselves.

Several companies also offer professional flight test services to homebuilders. High
Performance Aircraft Training (HPAT) has offered such services since the 1990s and
specializes in the flight test of Lancair Aircraft. HPAT’s pilots are primarily very highly
experienced civilian test pilots, and HPAT’s president is an aeronautical engineer. HPAT
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maintains a strong relationship with the Lancair factory and has access to expert
engineering services from the actual aircraft designers as well. Flight test is conducted in
accordance with AC90-89A [15] and selected elements of FAR Part 23 [24] and military
standards. The author’s company, 9G Aerospace Solutions (9G), offers similar services,
but differs slightly from HPAT in its approach to flight testing in that that a complete test
plan is authored, briefings and reviews are conducted formally, and a complete report of
test results is delivered. 9G’s flight test programs are provided by a test pilot / flight test
engineer team and are pattered after those conducted by the U.S. Navy and the
methodology taught at the U.S. Naval Test Pilot School, of which the author is a
graduate.

Other than in the case of the aforementioned companies and some other isolated services,
an absence of an engineering presence most distinctly differentiates homebuilt flight test
for hire from true professional flight test. The pilots who do perform homebuilt flight test
for hire may fly the same maneuvers that professional test pilots fly and may even fly
them to the same precision and collect the same data, however differences exist. These
differences are twofold. The first difference is that simply flying the maneuvers
suggested by “the book” (whichever text the pilot is using to guide him) does not
necessarily mean that constructive flight test is being accomplished. The concepts of
envelope expansion, build-up and regression testing require significant forethought and
analysis. The suggested order of tests may not be appropriate for the particular aircraft
being flown and the decision to fly the next test may be predicated on the successful
completion of the previous test. In the professional flight test world, the determination of
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the success of failure of a particular test is generally an engineering decision made in
concert with the test pilot. The failure of the test team to apply proper doctrine or having
only the test pilot make this decision exclusively from his point of view is, at the very
least, limiting. The engineer is considered a necessary check and balance and he is often
able to identify characteristics, deficiencies, and risks from outside the cockpit that are
not readily identified from inside the cockpit. This leads directly to the second major
difference between professional and homebuilt flight test. The test pilot may diligently
and accurately collect large amounts of data, but unless the data is reduced properly and
the results subsequently used to make sound decisions, the endeavor may be in vain. The
engineer is trained not only in the proper manipulation of the data, but also in using an
engineering approach to data analysis.

Professional flight testers have a characteristic combination of highly developed skills
and knowledge in addition to a strong support structure available to them to help
overcome the myriad risks that they face. The backgrounds of the numerous individuals
conducting homebuilt flight test are as varied as the aircraft that they test, but overall,
they compare unfavorably to formally-trained professional flight testers. Specifically,
untrained, low time in aircraft type amateur flight testers following flight test procedures
or varying quality, without clear guidance or, essentially, management and oversight of
their test program, do not have the tools available to them that professionals have to
conduct safe and effective flight test. The differences between amateur and professional
flight testers are examined in greater detail in Chapter 5.
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CHAPTER 3 - THE HUMAN FACTORS ANALYSIS AND CLASSIFICATION
SYSTEM (HFACS) AND ACCIDENT STATISTICS
As discussed in detail later in this chapter, statistically, low time in type pilots are at a
disadvantage even in certified aircraft. The low time in type pilot involuntarily becomes a
test pilot in an emergency, flying an unknown aircraft with unknown characteristics, and
he does so without any of the training or experience that a professional test pilot has to
aid him in guiding the situation to a successful resolution. With the current guidance
directly placing under-trained, low time in type homebuilders into the hazardous world of
flight test without the support structure that professional flight testers lean on to keep
themselves safe, homebuilders are thus encouraged to put themselves in exactly the
position where their lack of experience is a distinct disadvantage.

OVERVIEW OF THE HUMAN FACTORS ANALYSIS AND CLASSIFICATION
SYSTEM

The HFACS, introduced in the late 1990s, is a general human error analysis framework
that has been used within the military, commercial, and general aviation sectors to
systematically examine underlying human causal factors in aviation accidents [11].
HFACS draws upon the James Reason’s “Swiss cheese” model of human error, where
potential system failures are likened to layered slices of Swiss cheese. The layers
represent the latent and active failures in the system. Each layer, like Swiss cheese, has
holes representing the actual failure. Consider the latent failure of a pilot who is not
diligent in his VFR scan. The failure is always present (the layer), but only if another
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aircraft is on a collision course will it become a problem (the hole). If a failure occurs, it
is possible that the holes in each layer will not line up, breaking the chain of causal events
that lead to an accident. However, if the holes do line up, the errors can “fall through”
and lead to an accident.

A real life example of such as system is as follows: An air traffic controller has radar to
that allows him to see aircraft on a potential collision course. The radar has built-in
algorithms to warn the controller of a potential collision should he not notice it himself.
The aircraft themselves have collision avoidance equipment such as traffic collision
avoidance systems (TCAS) or traffic information systems (TIS) to warn them should the
controller and his system fail. Finally, at least in visual meteorological conditions
(VMC), the pilots themselves can see oncoming traffic and avoid a collision. Only if all
four of these “layers” fail will a midair collision occur. Shappell and Wiegmann’s
adaptation of Reason’s model is depicted in Figure 1.

The HFACS model establishes four layers of Reason’s model to characterize the aviation
accident causal environment. The first three represent latent failures in the system, while
the lowest one, Unsafe Acts, represents the active failure that leads to an accident. The
lowest layer is the only one that must be present for a human factors related accident to
occur.
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Figure 1 – The HFACS Model
Source: U.S. Department of Transportation. Federal Aviation Administration. 2000. The
Human Factors Analysis and Classification System – HFACS (February 2000), by
Scott A. Shappell and Douglas A. Wiegmann [11].
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The uppermost layer, Organizational Influences, represents the culture of the
organization within which the situation occurs and its failings. Management, the overall
climate of the organization, and the quality of and adherence to processes in place are all
organizational influences. [11] An example of this would be an airline which, finding
itself in bankruptcy, decides to cut back its training hours.

The next layer down in the HFACS model is Unsafe Supervision. This layer represents
the quality of the supervision of the participants in the accident. The failure of
supervisors to address problems or even notice problems in the first place, is included in
this layer. Also taken into account would be the characteristics of the supervision itself,
such as an inadequate number of supervisors or inadequate training for them. [11] In the
airline example, an example of this would be the promotion of inexperienced pilots to
instructor pilots.

The last layer representing latent failures is Preconditions for Unsafe Acts. This layer
includes substandard conditions and practices of operators. These, in turn, include
failures such as adverse physiological states (such as crew fatigue) and crew resource
mismanagement (such as failure to communicate) [11] Returning to the airline example,
let us consider a situation where the aircraft captain disengages the autopilot, but fails to
communicate this to the first officer. He then announces that he is going to the lavatory
and simply says “you have it” to the first officer. No positive change of controls takes
place and the first officer, believing that the autopilot is engaged, does not maintain
control of the aircraft.
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This example now leads to the bottom layer of the HFACS model – Unsafe Acts. Unsafe
acts, or active failures, include errors and violations that directly lead to the accident.
These can include decision errors, skill-based errors, perceptual errors, and both routine
and exceptional violations [11]. Our airline example has probably already taken into
account one unsafe act, as the failure to perform a positive change of controls would
likely be a violation of airline policy. Following his failure to control the airplane, the
example first officer finally notices the aircraft in an unusual attitude. He is poorly
trained in recovery from unusual attitudes, as the airline has reduced the training from ten
to two hours due to budget cuts and, to make matters worse, his instructor had never
received specific training in recovery from unusual attitudes. The first officer then makes
a skill-based error and over controls the aircraft, leading to a catastrophic structural
failure and loss of the aircraft. None of these failures, except for the unsafe act at the end,
were direct causes of the accident. However, the unsafe act would likely not have
occurred at all had the latent failures not lined up in such a way as to lead to the active
failure.

In short, HFACS is primarily a method of codifying the well-understood idea that most
aircraft accidents are a chain of causal events. Generally, one or more of these events is
avoidable and can break the chain that leads to the accident. HFACS further categorizes
the events, which leads to deeper understanding of accident prevention. The world of
homebuilt flight test is a case study in the application of HFACS. Although the homebuilt
flight test world is only loosely organized and supervised, organizational influences and
unsafe supervision are likely key players in the high accident rates of homebuilt aircraft
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in comparison with other GA aircraft. Better-documented are the effects of what are
classified as the precursors to unsafe acts. Finally, the very nature of the homebuilt flight
test world leads to a greater number of actual unsafe acts.

GENERAL AVIATION ACCIDENT STATISTICS AND HOMEBUILT AIRCRAFT
ACCIDENT RATES

Before analyzing the statistics in terms of the HFACS, it is necessary to describe their
sources and limitations. The primary source of data for this analysis was the NTSB’s
Annual Review of Accident Data [1-10], with the annual Nall Report on Accident Trends
and Factors published by the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA) providing
supplemental data [32-38]. An additional source of supporting data included Ron
Wanttaja’s excellent article on homebuilt safety from Kitplanes magazine’s September
2006 issue [39]. The 10-year period from 1992 to 2001 was used due to the availability of
complete data. Statistics appear to have remained similar for the period through 2005 [3238]. Prior to this period, homebuilt accidents appear to have been more prevalent;
however the number of homebuilt aircraft was far lower. As this study is focused on the
current and future states of homebuilt flight test, the more recent period, with its more
level accident rates and greater correlation to the current period, was examined.

In addition to the above sources, the NTSB accident database [40] was queried directly
and both the probable cause and factual reports studied. The query period used was from
January 1, 2002 to December 31, 2004, so as to correspond to the time period studied by
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Wanttaja [39]. In an effort to capture only incidents that occurred in the flight test period
or during subsequent flight test of homebuilt aircraft, the query was limited to amateur
built aircraft that included the terms “test” or “first flight”. Approximately 80 records,
including rotorcraft accidents, were returned and examined. Although not considered in
the aforementioned statistics, several rotary wing accidents were retained due to their
general relevance to the flight test of homebuilt aircraft (the fact that the aircraft was
rotary wing was irrelevant to the accident). Ultralight accidents were discarded, as
ultralights and ultralight operators are regulated differently. Ultimately, 64 total accidents
were considered. 60 were considered to be clearly test flights (including post-major
maintenance or modification), with an additional 4 accidents included as they were first
flights conducted by a new owner immediately after purchase of the aircraft from the
builder. This data was not considered to be comprehensive, but rather a more in-depth
examination of the data summarized in the other statistical sources cited.

According to its introduction, The NTSB’s Annual Review of Accident Data is a
statistical compilation and review of general aviation accidents that occurred in the
particular year and includes accidents involving U.S.-registered aircraft operating under
14 CFR Part 91 (Code of Federal Regulations, also known as FAR Part 91), as well as
public aircraft flights that do not involve military or intelligence agencies [10]. Aircraft
operating under Part 91 include aircraft that are flown for recreation and personal
transportation and certain aircraft operations that are flown with the intention of
generating revenue, including business flying, flight instruction, corporate/executive
flights, positioning or ferry flights, aerial application, pipeline/power line patrols, and
news and traffic reporting [10]. As such, the overall statistics are somewhat broad and
34

probably not relevant as baseline data for comparison to homebuilt accident statistics. As
most homebuilt aircraft are single-engine piston aircraft, the statistics for this class of
aircraft were generally used as a baseline. In the last 7 of the 10 years studied (19952001), specific data on accident pilot time in type was available. Furthermore, the data
specified the total number of flight hours by category (e.g., single engine piston). Due to
the specificity of the data available, average accident rates were extracted from the 19952001 period.

Overall, homebuilt aircraft averaged 32.23 accidents per 100,000 flight hours, compared
to 8.37 accidents per 100,000 flight hours for single engine piston aircraft in general.
Homebuilt aircraft averaged 8.78 fatal accidents per 100,000 flight hours, compared to
1.46 fatal accidents per 100,000 flight hours for single engine piston aircraft in general.
It should be noted that trends over the 10-year period showed all accident rates declining.
At the beginning of the analysis period, in 1995, single engine piston aircraft had an
accident rate 10.09 of accidents per 100,000 flight hours and homebuilt aircraft had an
accident rate of 44.50 accidents per 100,000 flight hours. Both rates declined over the
next 6 years, and in 2001, homebuilt aircraft averaged 26.76 accidents per 100,000 flight
hours, compared to 7.99 accidents per 100,000 flight hours for single engine piston
aircraft in general. Fatalities also declined; By 2001, homebuilt aircraft averaged 6.88
fatal accidents per 100,000 flight hours, compared to 1.41 fatal accidents per 100,000
flight hours for single engine piston aircraft in general in that year (compiled from NTSB
reports [1-10], and Wanttaja [39]. In spite of this decline, the pilot of a homebuilt aircraft
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was nearly four times as likely to be in either an accident or a fatal accident as his
certified aircraft counterpart.

More specifically, examination of the detailed NTSB reports reveals many causal factors
that are common failures cited in the HFACS [11]. These failures will be discussed in
greater detail in Chapter 4. Failure to maintain control or airspeed was cited as a
contributing causal factor in 18 (28.2%) of the reported accidents. These included three
pilot induced oscillation (PIO) accidents that were correlated to weaknesses in
airmanship or experience. Lack of experience (low time in type) was specifically cited by
the NTSB as a causal factor in 15.6% of the accidents. Poor decision-making was also a
common thread, with six of the accidents (9.4%) involving inadvertent flight during highspeed taxi tests, two accidents involving flight of aircraft with known deficiencies, and
two accidents involving test flights conducted in adverse weather conditions. Startlingly,
six of the accidents involved deliberate violations.

In three cases, passengers were

carried despite the fact that the aircraft was still in its designated flight test period.
Furthermore, in three other cases, the pilot did not have a valid pilot’s license and
medical certificate.

In addition to the human factors failures listed above, the overall hazardous nature of
homebuilt flight test was shown by the fact that 11 of the accident reports (17.2%) cited
improper construction as a cause and 12 reports (18.8%) were clearly due to engine
failure. It should be noted, however, that human factors were contributors to five of the
12 engine failure accidents, as lack of suitable terrain and improper pilot procedure were
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also cited as causes. This calls into question the pilot’s judgment in planning and
preparing for the test flight. Finally, first flight was clearly the most hazardous event of
all, as 23 of the 64 accidents (35.9%) occurred on first flight. In 20 of these 23 cases, time
in type was reported. The average time in type for the pilots on these first flights was
only 1.6 hours, with 13 of the 20 accident pilots reporting no time in type whatsoever.

THE EFFECT OF PILOTS WITH LOW TIME IN AICRAFT TYPE ON ACCIDENT
STATISTICS

From 1995 to 2001, the NTSB provided more detailed information on accident pilot time
and time in type of aircraft. Although this data is not broken out by category and class of
aircraft, the statistics still become far more informative. Over that 7-year period, it is
clear that as pilots gain experience, their likelihood of being involved in an accident
decreases. Pilots with 0 to 200 hours of total experience accounted for an average of
almost 18% of the total accident pilots, while each increment of 200 hours experience
resulted in a decrease in the % of total accident pilots [4-10]. Figure 2, illustrates this.
Even more telling with respect to homebuilt aircraft is the percentage of accident pilots
with low time in type of aircraft, as shown in Figure 3.

The clear indications from these numbers are that pilots who have less experience are
more likely to be involved in an accident and, more significantly, pilots who have low
time in the type of aircraft that they are operating are even more likely to be involved in
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Figure 2 - Percentage of Accident Pilots by Total Experience

Sources – U.S. Dept of Transportation Annual Reviews of Aircraft Accident Data, U.S.
General Aviation Calendar Years 1995-2001 [4-10] and Wanttaja, Ronald J. “Part 1:
Homebuilt Aircraft – How Safe Are They?” [39].
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Homebuilt Aircraft – How Safe Are They?” [39].
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an accident. Homebuilt pilots, especially those in the flight test phase (the first 25 to 40
hours) generally fall clearly into the latter category. It is often difficult (or even
impossible in the case of a unique design) to even find a flying example of the aircraft
that one is building. Even in the case of a common kit, finding an aircraft with the same
engine and avionics package can prove to be very difficult. As mentioned previously, in
the sample of NTSB reports studied, the average number of hours of time in type for
accident pilots on first flight was only 1.6 hours and lack of experience was specifically
cited by the NTSB as a causal factor in 15.6% of the accidents..

The myriad of aerodynamic modifications available for kits only compounds this
problem. One might argue that experience in the basic airframe is enough; however it is
more likely that the contrary is the case. For example, emergency procedures requiring
fast interpretation of the flight instruments could be very challenging for a pilot who is
not experienced with the particular EFIS installed in the aircraft. Engine and aerodynamic
differences can influence both performance and handling qualities, both of which are
more critical in an emergency situation that places the pilot near the edge of the operating
envelope. For example, a pilot used to flying his friend’s aircraft with a 115 hp. engine
might overspeed his own aircraft, equipped with a 150 hp. engine, during a recovery from
an unusual attitude. An additional consideration is that, in general, builder pilots who fly
someone else’s example of the aircraft that they are building are often flying with the
owner, who is presumably an experienced operator of that aircraft. This may reduce the
attention to detail by the builder pilot, as he is aware that in an emergency, he has an
experienced pilot in the airplane to assist him.
40

AMATEUR TEST PILOTS AND EFFECTIVE LEVEL OF EXPERIENCE IN
AIRCRAFT TYPE

Stepping back from the actual numbers, many homebuilt pilots, again especially in the
flight test phase, also can be placed into the first category of pilots with less experience
overall. This is due to their lack of recent experience. Although many builders are
seasoned pilots, many have also neglected their pilot skills during the long process of
building their airplane. Flying, like other neuro-muscular skills and complex behaviors
which require the assimilation of numerous sensory inputs, coordination of outputs, and
resource management, is a perishable skill. The value of recent experience is well
understood and illustrated by the presence of currency requirements and routine flight
reviews for all pilots. Even a private pilot who simply wishes to take his friend up
sightseeing must have logged three takeoffs and landings within the past 90 days.

Another consideration is type of experience. Professional test pilots typically not only
have thousands of hours of flight time, but that flight time is in a variety of aircraft and in
a professional environment. While flying, the test pilot is flying specific maneuvers,
carefully observing the aircraft’s responses, and collecting data. There is a significant
difference between flying with precision and extreme focus on the behavior of an
unknown aircraft for an hour and flying to the next field over for a “$100 hamburger”.
This difference stretches beyond the aircraft as well. Prior to the flight, the test pilot must
study the aircraft and the test plan and be prepared to identify even the smallest of
deficiencies. Upon arrival, he must condense his thoughts, articulate them to the test
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team, and assist in the data reduction and reporting. An hour of flight test might occupy
20 or more hours of the test pilot’s attention, all of which increase his experience. The
private pilot going for lunch may have dedicated an hour to flight planning, checking
weather, and preflighting the aircraft. Upon his return, he is likely (and justifiably) more
concerned with avoiding an automobile accident on his way home from the airport than
with any sort of postflight introspection.

It is the kind of experience that test pilots acquire that helps them offset the risks
associated with low time in type. The types of failures that can be associated with low
time in type, such as loss of control or failure to properly respond to an emergency, can
be avoided by the experience of the test pilot. The test pilot is more comfortable with a
wide range of aircraft handling qualities and his close attention to the aircraft’s behavior
makes him more likely to identify a controllability issue before entering a critical flight
regime. Finally, his preflight study of the aircraft, its systems, and procedures puts him in
a better position to execute emergency procedures than the average private pilot, should
the need arise. This is not to say that the test pilot eliminates the risks associated with low
time in type, merely that he mitigates them. Although no causal link is explicit in the
statistics, the two dominant initiators of homebuilt accidents from 2002 to 2004 (in
accidents where a probable cause was determined) were pilot error – failure to control
and power loss due to engine mechanical problems [39], precisely the types of situations
in which a professional test pilot’s training and experience would give him an advantage
over a low time in type pilot. In the NTSB reports studied, 17.2% of the accidents were
also cases of improper construction, another situation that places any pilot at a distinct
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disadvantage. The low time in type pilot is poorly equipped to deal with this type of
situation, one which likely requires what Shappell and Wiegmann call a “novel solution”
[11]. It should also be noted that in this period, Van’s aircraft accounted for just one of
the 27 confirmed first flight accidents and 7% of the crashes during the 40-hour test
period. [39] It is a logical assumption that, since Van’s aircraft are the most popular
kitplanes in the United States, accounting for over one-third of the aircraft registered,
most pilots accumulate some amount of experience in the aircraft prior to first flight [39].

Wanttaja also provides details regarding homebuilt accidents during the flight test period.
The statistics are startling. For the 2002-2004 period, the accident rate on first flight was
1.01% and over the first 40 hours it was 3.3% [39]. Considering that the overall accident
rate for GA aircraft from 1992 to 2001 was 7.71 per 100,000 hours [1-10], first flight and
the flight test period appear to be extremely hazardous endeavors. Thus the chances of
crashing on the first flight of a homebuilt are on the same order of magnitude of the risk
that a NASA astronaut faces of being killed in an accident in the space shuttle (two fatal
accidents over approximately 120 flights). This is significant, as spaceflight is wellunderstood to be a dangerous activity that is, to date, only conducted by trained
individuals with a clear understanding of the risks involved.
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CHAPTER 4 – APPLICATION OF THE HUMAN FACTORS ANALYSIS AND
CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM (HFACS) TO THE CURRENT STATE OF
HOMEBUILT FLIGHT TEST PRAXIS

Returning to HFACS terminology, the homebuilt pilot is far more likely to commit the
unsafe act that causes an accident, especially in the critical flight test period. The
weaknesses in the system within which most amateur flight testers operate, however,
affect the pilot’s ability to overcome the problems associated with low time in type at
several levels. In fact, the differences between professional and amateur flight test are
responsible for many of the failures at each of the layers in the HFACS model. Before
examining in depth the types of unsafe acts associated with amateur flight testers, we will
look at the other side of the failure continuum and examine the latent failures from the
top of the model down.

LATENT FAILURES - ORGANIZATIONAL INFLUENCES

In traditional HFACS analysis, negative organizational influences are cited as latent
failures. These include influences such as the management of an airframe manufacturer
pushing its flight test organization to cut corners or other, “fallible decisions of upperlevel management [which] directly affect supervisory practices, as well as the conditions
of operators” [11]. Shappell and Wiegmann list the specific categories of organizational
influences as resource management, organizational climate, and organizational process
[11]. It should be noted that none of these are intrinsically negative influences. In fact,
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good resource management, a positive organizational climate, and a solid organizational
process would all make flight test safer. The issue in the case of homebuilt flight test is
that very few organizational influences, either positive or negative, exist.

Some of this is, of course, by design. One factor that makes homebuilts so appealing is
the flexibility afforded by the Experimental category. Free of the restrictions of FAA
certification, kits designers can trade handling qualities and safety features for raw
performance, allowing builders to acquire airplanes with performance specifications of
those double the cost. Similarly, builders are free to modify plans and kits, mate any
powerplant they wish to the airframe, and install any avionics that they desire. The FAA
enjoys benefits due to this arrangement as well, needing only a small number of relatively
inexpensive designated airworthiness representatives (DARs) to inspect aircraft and
publishing only a minimal number of advisory circulars and orders governing homebuilt
aircraft.

As a result, the homebuilder finds himself in a loose organization with inconsistent
influences. The FAA, as mentioned before, tells him to engage in a professional-league
flight test program, but encourages him to perform the tests himself. The EAA, an
organization that nearly all homebuilders are members of, provides plenty of advice and
even flight advisors to help homebuilders determine if they are ready to act as test pilots.
Finally, the homebuilder’s organizational influences include the influence of the amateur
test team that he assembles. This may include fellow builders, flight instructors or
experienced pilots, or even well-meaning friends and family members. At the very least,
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it is unlikely that a solid organizational process is in place to govern the homebuilder’s
flight test program. The loose structure of the typical homebuilder’s flight test
“organization” clearly represents a latent failure, as the quality of guidance and oversight
provided by this organization is directly proportional to its ability to protect the pilot from
danger. Also important to consider is that this loose organization has no authority over
the builder and cannot stop him from making a bad decision, thereby negating one of the
major benefits of an organization.

The case studies presented later in this chapter

illustrate the weaknesses of an organization which is only advisory in nature. If one looks
at the selected examples of negative organizational influences provided by Shappell and
Wiegmann, many of these are present in a typical homebuilt flight test program [11].
Most notable are:

Standards and Instructions – as discussed in depth in Chapter 2, the sources of flight
test guidance for homebuilders come from a myriad of unregulated sources.
Professional testers typically follow published military, regulatory, or corporate
standards and instructions.
Deficient planning - the builder himself, not likely to be experienced in flight test
planning, is doing the planning.
Clearly defined objectives – again, the builder himself is defining the test objectives.
Objectivity is sacrificed and test objectives may be oversimplified or too broad.
Instructions – as discussed in depth in Chapter 2, the sources of flight test guidance
for homebuilders comes from a myriad of unregulated sources.
Risk management – few homebuilders are trained in implementing organizational
risk management methods.
Safety programs – large flight test organizations have programs established to ensure
safety and to catalog lessons learned from previous efforts. No such organized
program exists for the homebuilder.
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It is clear from these examples that amateur flight testers are highly susceptible to latent
failures due to organizational influences (or lack thereof). Amateur testers, already
handicapped by their lack of experience, are put at additional risk due to the absence of a
support structure that could provide guidance as to how to conduct safe and effective
flight test. Furthermore, the presence of an effective support organization would provide
oversight to ensure that tests are performed in accordance with this guidance and to
review decisions made by the builder.

LATENT FAILURES – UNSAFE SUPERVISION

The next level down in the HFACS model is Unsafe Supervision. Similar to the case with
organizational influences, oftentimes homebuilt flight test is characterized by the absence
of any supervision. When supervision does exist, it is generally a matter of self-policing
or supervision by individuals who are not specifically qualified. The direct relevance of
many of the potential latent failures suggested by Shappell and Wiegmann to the
homebuilder’s flight test program warrants a more detailed study. Shappell and
Wiegmann list some examples of failures associated with unsafe supervision in Table 1.

Homebuilt flight test, with its weak or nonexistent supervision, is characterized by nearly
all of the latent failures listed in Table 1. It should also be emphasized that the HFACS
was developed as an analysis tool for all aviation accidents – not only flight test [11]. The
high level of intrinsic risk and the fact that flight test is a complicated process that
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contains risks at all levels leads to a strong correlation between the failures suggested and
those encountered in flight testing.

The first main heading in Table 1, Inadequate Supervision, sums up the typical homebuilt
flight test experience. More accurately, in the homebuilt world, there is generally no

Table 1 – Excerpt from Shappell and Wiegmann, U.S. Dept. of Transportation 2000.
Selected examples of Unsafe Supervision (Note: This is not a complete listing)
Inadequate Supervision
Failed to provide guidance
Failed to provide operational doctrine
Failed to provide oversight
Failed to provide training
Failed to track qualifications
Failed to track performance

Failed to Correct a Known Problem
Failed to correct a document in error
Failed to identify and at-risk aviator
Failed to initiate corrective action
Failed to report unsafe tendencies

Planned Inappropriate Operations
Failed to provide adequate brief data
Failed to provide adequate brief time
Improper manning
Mission not in accordance with
rules/regulations
Provided inadequate opportunity for crew rest

Supervisory Violations
Authorized unnecessary hazard
Failed to enforce rules and regulations
Authorized unqualified crew for flight

Source: U.S. Department of Transportation. Federal Aviation Administration. 2000. The
Human Factors Analysis and Classification System – HFACS (February 2000), by
Scott A. Shappell and Douglas A. Wiegmann [11].

supervision. As mentioned above, there are loose organizational influences, but none of
these influences, except, to a limited degree, the FAA, have any authority over the
builder. The difference between advice and supervision is the ability of the advisee to
ignore the advice. The builder is left with only advice and, therefore, is his own
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supervisor. Again, this is illustrated later in the case studies. Thus, examining each of the
subheadings:

Failed to provide guidance – the homebuilder often receives guidance, but the quality
of this guidance varies greatly. Even within the EAA flight advisor program, the
qualifications are somewhat broad. Furthermore, this guidance comes in the form
of advice, which may be rejected by the homebuilder.
Failed to provide operational doctrine – the homebuilder receives only advice
regarding any sort of flight test doctrine. The intrinsic value of doctrine is that it is
based on authoritative sources and effective when it is followed without variance.
As mentioned before, the advice received by homebuilders comes from often
contradictory sources of varying quality.
Failed to provide oversight – except in the case of the FAA, which is concerned with
the airworthiness inspection, flight test area, and duration of the test period - no
oversight exists with respect to homebuilt flight test. Without an actual supervisor,
the homebuilder can choose to perform (or omit) any test. This is discussed
further below.
Failed to provide training – Any training that the homebuilder receives, other than
that required by the FAA to meet the qualifications to operate the type of aircraft,
is at his own discretion.
Failed to track qualifications and Failed to track performance – these are entirely the
responsibility to the builder, although the former is to some degree influenced by
insurance requirements.
With respect to homebuilt flight test, the second main heading in Table 1, Planned
Inappropriate Operations, reflects the lack of clear guidance as to how to safely conduct
a flight test program. In two of the case studies, builders chose to conduct high speed taxi
tests in adverse wind conditions. This is a classic example of planning inappropriate
operations, as professional flight testers treat high speed taxi as flight (and therefore
would only conduct these tests under conditions appropriate for flight test) due to the
high likelihood of an inadvertent liftoff. Without any supervision, the homebuilder is left
to piece together a flight test program from the various sources of information. This area
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is particularly critical, as it is in the test planning that risks are identified and mitigated.
The subheading “Mission not in accordance with rules/regulations” can be interpreted
broadly in this case. Assuming that the homebuilder follows FAA regulations, he is still
left without any such regulations regarding test operations. Whereas a military flight
tester might have a regulation that he must bail out if out of control below a certain
altitude or not conduct certain tests in certain weather conditions, the homebuilder has no
such safety-based regulations to protect him. He may plan to conduct a spin test on a day
with limited visibility, for example. The remaining subheadings suggest that a supervisor
fails to allow for safe operations such as proper briefings and crew rest. In the case of the
homebuilder, he may not allow for these as well.

The next heading in the table, Failed to Correct a Known Problem, can also be similarly
expanded to apply to the homebuilder acting as his own supervisor. The final heading,
Supervisory Violations, is subsumed by the unsafe act itself if no supervisor exists.
Overall, the lack of supervision has a similar influence on homebuilt flight test as the
absence of positive organizational influences in that another layer of latent failures is
introduced to an environment that is already rife with risk due to the shortcomings of its
participants.

LATENT FAILURES – PRECURSORS TO UNSAFE ACTS

Precursors to unsafe acts, or unsafe aircrew conditions, are factors directly associated
with the aircrew that immediately set the stage for the unsafe act. These precursors,
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according to Shappell and Wiegmann, are either mental or physiological states or
limitations, or failures by a multi-person crew to work together (poor crew resource
management) [11]. Of the greatest concern to homebuilders are the single-pilot issues, as
most homebuilts are operated by a single pilot. Table 2, also excerpted from Shappell and
Wiegmann, lists many of these potential unsafe aircrew conditions.

Although almost all of the conditions listed in Table 2 are potentially present in the flight
test of homebuilt aircraft, the first heading, Adverse Mental States, contains the unsafe
aircrew conditions that are most relevant to homebuilt accidents in the flight test phase.
Factors such as complacency, haste, misplaced motivation, and task saturation are likely
to be present in a homebuilder’s cockpit during flight test, particularly in the case when a
builder unqualified to perform the tests chooses to do so. It is at this layer in the HFACS
model where the amateur pilot’s lack of time in type becomes a significant factor.

In many situations, many of these adverse mental states are present. Consider the
homebuilder who, buoyed by the achievement of completing his aircraft (and misled by
the prevalent information), chooses to perform his own tests despite having little or no
understanding of flight testing. In this case, the evolution begins with misplaced
motivation. Complacency may be an issue as well, particularly if the builder has many
hours of total flight time and believes that, as an experienced aviator, there are few
situations that he cannot handle. Now consider a hypothetical situation where, once in the
air, the builder discovers that the ailerons are misrigged and that, despite a large,
continuous lateral stick input, the aircraft will roll without the application of opposite
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Table 2 – Excerpt from Shappell and Wiegmann, U.S. Dept. of Transportation 2000.
Selected examples of Unsafe Aircrew Conditions (Note: This is not a complete listing)
SUBSTANDARD CONDITIONS OF
OPERATORS

SUBSTANDARD PRACTICE OF
OPERATORS

Adverse Mental States
Channelized attention
Complacency
Distraction
Mental Fatigue
Get-home-it is
Haste
Loss of situational awareness
Misplaced motivation
Task saturation

Crew Resource Management
Failed to back-up
Failed to communicate/coordinate
Failed to conduct adequate brief
Failed to use all available resources
Failure of leadership
Misinterpretation of traffic calls

Adverse Physiological States
Impaired physiological state
Medical illness
Physiological incapacitation
Physical fatigue

Personal Readiness
Excessive physical training
Self-medicating
Violation of crew rest requirement
Violation of bottle-to-throttle requirement

Physical/Mental Limitation
Insufficient reaction time
Visual limitation
Incompatible intelligence/aptitude
Incompatible physical capability

Source: U.S. Department of Transportation. Federal Aviation Administration. 2000. The
Human Factors Analysis and Classification System – HFACS (February 2000), by
Scott A. Shappell and Douglas A. Wiegmann [11].
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rudder. In addition, one cylinder’s temperature is steadily climbing toward the limit.
Now, faced with a poorly flying aircraft with a suspect powerplant, the builder’s attention
becomes channelized and he focuses on only one of his two major issues. The heavy
workload associated with the controllability issue could in itself be considered task
saturation. Under these adverse conditions, factors such as haste (in decision making),
distraction, and loss of situational awareness are likely to develop. It is not difficult to
imagine this pilot, under these adverse circumstances, committing an unsafe act such as
failure to control the aircraft.

ACTIVE FAILURES – UNSAFE ACTS

Finally, HFACS brings us to the “pointed edge of the spear” – the unsafe acts themselves.
Every accident caused by pilot error must, by definition, be caused by one or more unsafe
acts. The other layers alone, as mentioned above, describe only factors which establish an
environment in which the unsafe act can occur and result in an accident. As shown in
Table 3, Shappell and Wiegmann classify unsafe acts into four categories: Skill-Based
Errors, Decision Errors, Perceptual Errors, and Violations. The inexperienced, low time
in type test pilot of a homebuilt aircraft who encounters an emergency on the first flight
of the aircraft and crashes is likely to have committed several of these errors.
Furthermore, by Shappell and Wiegmann’s definition of violations, he has likely
committed some of these as well [11].
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Human error is by far the most common cause of GA aircraft accidents, both homebuilt
and certified. Specifically, failure to control the aircraft is the most common cause,
accounting for over 40% of homebuilt aircraft accidents [39]. Many of the errors listed in
Table 3 can result in loss of control, including inadvertent use of controls, poor
technique, over-controlling the aircraft, wrong response to an emergency, or any of the
perceptual errors. The inexperienced homebuilder on his first flight is, in all but a few
cases, very inexperienced in flight testing procedures, techniques, and operations. Unless
he is an aerobatic pilot, he has not received any training in how to deal with
controllability issues. Even with aerobatic training, his loss of control training is limited
to addressing issues which develop in a generally predictable manner, not in the
sometimes sudden and unpredictable manner in which controllability issues can develop
during flight test. Similarly, unless he has professional-level training such as an ATP
rating, he is not trained or experienced in precision flying. Again, this type of training
only correlates to a finite degree, as the ability to fly an instrument landing system (ILS)
approach to ATP standards does not necessarily translate to flying a windup turn to test
pilot standards. This lack of experience and training engenders an environment where the
pilot is at an increased risk of making decision errors. Shappell and Wiegmann state:
… errors can, and often do, occur when a situation is either not recognized or
misdiagnosed, and the wrong procedure is applied. This is particularly true when
pilots are placed in highly time-critical emergencies like an engine malfunction on
takeoff.

However, even in aviation, not all situations have corresponding procedures to deal
with them. Therefore, many situations require a choice to be made among multiple
response options. Consider the pilot flying home after a long week away from the
family who unexpectedly confronts a line of thunderstorms directly in his path. He
can choose to fly around the weather, divert to another field until the weather passes,
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Table 3 – Excerpt from Shappell and Wiegmann, U.S. Dept. of Transportation 2000.
Selected examples of Unsafe Acts of Pilot Operators (Note: This is not a complete
listing)
ERRORS
Skill-based Errors
Breakdown in visual scan
Failed to prioritize attention
Inadvertent use of controls
Omitted step in procedure
Omitted checklist item
Poor technique
Over-controlled the aircraft
Decision Errors
Improper procedure
Misdiagnosed emergency
Wrong response to emergency
Exceeded ability
Inappropriate maneuver
Poor decision

VIOLATIONS
Failed to adhere to brief
Failed to use the radar altimeter
Flew and unauthorized approach
Violated training rules
Flew and overaggressive maneuver
Failed to properly prepare for the flight
Briefed unauthorized flight
Not current/qualified for the mission
Intentionally exceeded the limits of the aircraft
Continued low-altitude flight in VMC
Unauthorized low-altitude canyon running

Perceptual Errors (due to)
Misjudged distance/altitude/airspeed
Spatial disorientation
Visual illusion

Source: U.S. Department of Transportation. Federal Aviation Administration. 2000. The
Human Factors Analysis and Classification System – HFACS (February 2000), by
Scott A. Shappell and Douglas A. Wiegmann [11].
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or penetrate the weather hoping to quickly transition through it. Confronted with
situations such as this, choice decision errors (Orasanu, 1993), or knowledge-based
mistakes as they are otherwise known (Rasmussen, 1986), may occur. This is
particularly true when there is insufficient experience, time, or other outside pressures
that may preclude correct decisions. Put simply, sometimes we chose well, and
sometimes we don’t [11].
Finally, there are occasions when a problem is not well understood, and formal
procedures and response options are not available. It is during these ill-defined
situations that the invention of a novel solution is required. In a sense, individuals
find themselves where no one has been before, and in many ways, must literally fly
by the seats of their pants. Individuals placed in this situation must resort to slow and
effortful reasoning processes in an environment where time is a luxury rarely
afforded. Not surprisingly, while this type of decision making is more infrequent then
other forms, the relative proportion of problem-solving errors committed is markedly
higher [11].

The trained and experienced test pilot is better prepared to make the correct decisions in a
timely manner and, when called upon, to develop the “novel solution” that Shappell and
Wiegmann refer to.

Shappell and Wiegmann define violations as “a willful disregard for the rules and
regulations that govern safe flight” [11]. As there are (unbeknownst to many homebuilt
flight testers) industry standard rules that govern flight test, those who are not qualified to
perform flight test, expand the envelope too rapidly (flying overaggressive maneuvers),
or fly maneuvers that they did not specifically prepare for (fail to adhere to the “brief” –
formal or otherwise) are all committing violations. All of the above violations can
directly result in either a structural failure or loss of control of the aircraft.

The large-scale picture is that in the amateur flight testing of homebuilt aircraft, many of
the latent failures that are present in aviation operation occur with greater frequency,
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resulting in a larger number of “holes” in Reason’s Swiss cheese model. As a result, the
holes line up more often for homebuilt flight testers than they do in the broader world of
GA. This sets the stage for the unsafe acts which can cause accidents, and, again,
homebuilt flight testers are placed in a situation where they are more likely to commit
these unsafe acts than their counterparts taking their Cessna 182 for a “$100 hamburger”
or the King Air pilots racing to Hilton Head to pick up the company president after a
round of golf. Taken as a whole, the inexperienced, low time in type test pilot of a
homebuilt aircraft who encounters an emergency on the first flight of the aircraft is likely
to have fallen through to the bottom layer of Reason’s Swiss cheese model prior to
starting his engine. Once the emergency occurs, he is likely to find himself committing
multiple skill-based and decision errors which compound the problem rather than
mitigate it, ultimately resulting in an accident.

CASE STUDIES

To further illustrate the application of the HFACS to homebuilt flight test, the following
case studies are examined. In the first case, the pilot made a series of poor decisions that
resulted in the testing of an intrinsically unsafe aircraft in non-optimal conditions. The
pilot knew that the airplane had controllability deficiencies and was also concerned about
the crosswind conditions which might exacerbate these problems. In spite of this, he
proceeded to attempt the high speed taxi tests. He had only planned to conduct taxi tests,
but for some reason changed his mind and decided to attempt flight. He then made
another poor decision when he chose to takeoff instead of aborting when he began to run
out of runway.
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In the second case, the pilot, who had no flight experience, was killed when he
apparently entered a PIO situation on the aircraft’s first flight. The pilot was urged by
friends to perform his first flight at another airport which had emergency fire and rescue
services. The pilot also did not accept an offer to receive flight training in a similar
airplane to the one he had built. The pilot also had an antihistamine in his system that
could cause drowsiness and slowing of cognitive and motor skills.

In the third case, the pilot was conducting high speed taxi tests and was concerned about
gusty wind conditions. In spite of this, he proceeded and became airborne. He appeared
to have PIO problems and lost control of the aircraft when attempting to bring the aircraft
back for a landing.

CASE ONE - NTSB Identification: CHI02LA143. May 25, 2002

The following is an excerpt form the NTSB’s probable cause report on the crash of a 75%
Scale Fokker D8, registration number N2188X, in Derby, KS [41]. The pilot received
only minor injuries.

The airplane contacted trees following a loss of directional control during takeoff.
The pilot reported he was short on runway when he initiated the takeoff so he had to
"prematurely pull the aircraft off the ground..." The pilot stated that once airborne the
wind pushed the airplane toward a line of trees. He reported that he attempted to
straighten the airplane heading, but instead the airplane hit the trees at an altitude of
about 10 feet above the ground. The airplane contacted trees along the right side of
the runway. The pilot reported the winds were out of the west at 15 knots. The pilot
reported that the ailerons are ineffective until reaching 60 mph. He also reported that
the rudder was so sensitive that at 50 mph, 1- inch of rudder pedal displacement
would result in a 180 degree flat turn.
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The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this
accident as follows:
Inadequate preflight planning and inadequate compensation for the wind conditions
which resulted in a failure to maintain directional control of the airplane. Factors
associated with the accident were the crosswind and the trees which the airplane
contacted during the takeoff [41].
In this case, the private pilot, with no noted flight test experience, had already flown the
aircraft for 20 hours and was aware of its dangerous flying qualities.

The aileron

ineffectiveness at low speed and the extreme rudder sensitivity would make the aircraft
extremely difficult to control in the lateral-directional axes. The later factual report
revealed that, “The pilot reported that his original intention was to perform a high speed
taxi test after which he was going to return to the hangar. He reported the airplane ran
good during the test. Following the taxi test, he then pulled the power back to idle, but
instead of going to the hangar, he decided to takeoff, fly around the traffic pattern, and
land [42].”

This accident fits neatly into the HFACS model. At the highest level, a lack of oversight
allowed an intrinsically dangerous aircraft to be operated in spite of known deficiencies
(poor risk management). A lack of supervision was also a factor, as the pilot, with no
flight test experience, indicated that he was concerned about the crosswinds [42]. He
chose, however, to test anyway. An adequate “supervisor”, either a trained tester or
simply an experienced person aiding in the test process, could have helped the pilot make
a better decision. Furthermore, a supervisor would have stopped the pilot from
conducting an unplanned (equivalent to unbriefed) operation (the flight itself). The
precursors to the unsafe acts are evidenced by the pilot’s obvious complacency and
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misplaced motivation – he chose to conduct an unbriefed test in an aircraft with
questionable controllability and in non-optimal weather conditions. He also failed to
conduct an adequate “brief” for himself. Finally, he committed a series of errors and
“violations” that led to the accident itself. He made the aforementioned poor decisions to
initiate the testing, then the flight, considering the aircraft and the test environment. His
decision to conduct high speed taxi tests in gusty wind conditions was risky in and of
itself. Professional testers treat high speed taxi as a flight test due to the high likelihood
of inadvertent liftoff. As such, the weather conditions should have been suitable for
flight. He then made the poor decision to take the aircraft flying instead of aborting on
the runway. Most importantly, he violated his test plan. Whether the plan was formal or
informal, he chose to adhere to his original plan to limit his operations to ground tests.

CASE TWO - NTSB Identification: LAX03LA237. July 20, 2003

The next case study is that of a fatal accident involving a Thompson Quickie aircraft in
Tehachapi, CA, registration number N218DT. The probable cause report follows.

The airplane entered a pilot induced oscillation during takeoff, collided with the
runway, and was destroyed by a post impact fire. The accident occurred during the
pilot's maiden flight in his experimental homebuilt airplane. Witnesses saw the
airplane initially climb about 25 feet above the runway. Thereafter, the airplane
descended until landing hard on the runway in a nose low pitch attitude. The airplane
bounced/porpoised and impacted again whereupon it nosed over, slid to a stop, and
was consumed by fire. Examination of the thermally destroyed composite airplane
revealed no evidence of a preimpact mechanical malfunction or failure, and the
reason for the pilot's failure to maintain control was not ascertained. No evidence of
any preexisting physical disability was noted during the pilot's autopsy. Evidence of
diphenhydramine was found in the pilot's blood and urine. This drug is an over-thecounter antihistamine preparations and typically results in drowsiness, and is
associated with degradation of cognitive and motor tasks.
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The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this
accident as follows:
The pilot's inadvertent entry into a pilot induced oscillation and failure to maintain
airplane control during the takeoff initial climb. A contributing factor was the pilot's
likely impairment by an over-the-counter drug substance that degraded his physical
and mental performance [43].

The information in the above report and the later factual report [44] showed that the pilot
made a series of errors that led to this accident and his death. In contrast to the first case
study, this pilot did have an “organization” to support him in the sense that he asked for
help and advice from some friends. Unfortunately, he failed to heed their advice, which is
one of the severe shortcomings of having organizational and supervisory influences that
are advisory only – the pilot is not compelled to listen. In this case, “Work associates
having technical expertise in experimental aircraft design, construction, and propulsion
systems examined the pilot's airplane within a few days preceding the accident flight. The
associates suggested that the pilot perform his maiden flight at a nearby airport having
emergency fire and rescue facilities. The pilot declined the recommendation. The
associates reported that the pilot did not accept an offer to receive flight training in an
airplane model similar to the one he had built [44].” In effect, he received inadequate
organizational influences and supervision only because he did not have to listen. The
pilot’s decision not to listen was itself one of the preconditions for unsafe acts. In doing
so, the pilot exhibited complacency and failed to use all available resources as noted in
the HFACS [11]. He was also, as noted in the report, self-medicating, which added yet
another unsafe aircrew condition. The actual unsafe act was actually the least dramatic of
the failures. The pilot likely over-controlled the aircraft or simply exceeded his ability to
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fly the aircraft. Unfortunately, the previous failures had placed him in a position where
an error’s effects would only be exacerbated.

CASE THREE - NTSB Identification SEA03LA118. June 26, 2003

The third case study is that of an accident involving a Herrin Hornet aircraft, registration
number N1424 in Newberg, OR, in which the pilot was killed when, again, he conducted
unplanned flight tests in gusty wind conditions. The NTSB’s probable cause report
follows.

A witness to the accident reported that the pilot of the accident airplane made
numerous high-speed taxi runs prior to the accident flight. After completing the taxi
maneuvers, the pilot told the witness he was apprehensive about trying to fly the
airplane on account of localized gusty winds. After talking to the witness, the pilot
taxied back to the runway and resumed the taxi tests. The witness reported that after
completing a number of passes down the runway, he observed the airplane takeoff.
He reported that the airplane appeared to be porpoising as it ascended over the
runway. Additional witnesses reported that they observed the airplane in a climbing
right turn over the airport. The airplane climbed to about 200-300 above ground level
(AGL) and appeared to be in a modified downwind for runway 25. The witnesses
reported that as the pilot turned from right base to final, the airplane abruptly pitched
nose down (approximately 60 degrees). The witnesses reported that the airplane
momentarily returned to a level flight attitude, but pitched down a second time just
before impacting terrain in a nose low attitude. Maintenance records indicated that the
airplane was issued a special airworthiness certificate, experimental category, on
April 23, 2003. The accident flight was the airplanes first flight subsequent to
receiving the airworthiness certificate. Post accident examination of the aircraft
revealed
no
evidence
of
a
mechanical
failure
or
malfunction.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this
accident as follows:
Aircraft control not maintained while maneuvering for landing [45].
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As in the second case study, the factual report indicates this pilot ended up conducting his
first flight on a day that he had only planned to conduct high speed taxi tests [46].
Furthermore, much as in the first case study, the weather was such that even high speed
taxi should have not have been conducted, as the weather conditions were not conducive
to flight. Once again, the accident pilot indicated to a witness that he was concerned, but
allowed his other motivations to lead him to commit violations of his own, albeit
informal, protocol and to make poor decisions thereafter. The witness’s report that the
airplane appeared to be “porpoising” after takeoff suggested that the pilot experienced
PIO or a general controllability problem with the aircraft. With no time in type and no
reported test pilot experience [46], the pilot was in what ended up being an untenable
situation. It is possible that had he waited until a calm day and properly prepared for the
flight, he would have had more success at controlling the aircraft and brought it down
successfully.

Thus, the pilot in this case study made similar errors to those in the first two, conducting
tests with no organizational support or supervision. Again, he exhibited an adverse
mental state such as complacency, haste, or misplaced motivation, although it is unclear
as to which one was the precursor to the poor decisions to test on that day, and then
conduct first flight, the latter of which could also be seen as a violation (failure to adhere
to his “brief”). Finally, the unsafe act itself was probably a combination of the above
decisions, the pilot exceeding his ability and several skill-based errors such as poor
technique and over-controlling the aircraft.
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In summary, these three case studies are just examples of the types of failures that are
exhibited by homebuilders in the conduct of their flight test. All three pilots placed
themselves in very high risk situations based on their failures at the upped levels. Then
without the proper training, experience, and support, they experienced failures at the
lower levels which led to accidents, and in two of the three cases, fatalities.
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CHAPTER 5 – COMPARISON OF PROFESSIONAL FLIGHT TEST
METHODOLOGY WITH TYPICAL HOMEBUILT AIRCRAFT FLIGHT TEST
PRAXIS

Contrary to the practices of the homebuilt flight test industry, participants in the
professional flight test world addresses the potential failures described in the HFACS
model at every level and strive to mitigate the associated risks. In fact, the Society of
Engineering Test Pilots’ mission statement is as follows:

To broaden professional relationships through the sharing of ideas and experiences
which promote and enhance safety, communication and education. To prevent
accidents and loss of life by improving safety, design and flight test of aerospace
vehicles and their related systems. To provide a forum to disseminate information to
those in the aerospace industry for the benefit of all aviation users [47].

The very first stated goal is the prevention of accidents. Although most homebuilt testers
would probably agree with this attitude in principle, their actions are, as we have seen,
often to the contrary. Prior to examining how professional flight test teams conduct their
programs so as to minimize the likelihood of an accident (while simultaneously
maximizing the likelihood of obtaining good data), it is beneficial to understand what
exactly comprises professional flight test.

DEFINITION OF PROFESSIONAL FLIGHT TEST

At some level, any flight test endeavor conducted for compensation could be considered
professional flight test. For the moment, however, we will consider professional flight
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test to include all flight test conducted for compensation by trained personnel. The latter
part of that statement can also be interpreted rather broadly. Flight test personnel
throughout the aerospace industry are trained in a variety of different ways. Test pilots
and, to a lesser extent, flight test engineers, are often graduates of one of the test pilot
schools. Other flight test engineers receive only on-the-job training, sometimes under the
tutelage of a test pilot school graduate. Of course, in both of these cases the individuals
have the requisite underlying training and experience - general flight training and
typically a minimum number of hours for pilots, and an engineering degree for engineers
(and all but a small number of test pilots). The above cases are the norm, but are by no
means the only methods by which flight test professionals are trained. Many test pilots
and engineers have taken short courses at one of the test pilot schools, thereby gaining
portions of the training provided in the typical year-long courses. Some test pilots,
especially in the commercial sector, are simply very experienced airline or corporate
pilots who have received on-the-job-training as test pilots. Some professional test pilots
of homebuilt aircraft are self-trained, studying and practicing the techniques found in
books on the subject such as Askue and Englert’s texts [13, 12].

Short courses, on-the-job training (OJT), and self-training are not necessarily negative. If
the short courses are applicable to the specific type of testing that the tester is going to be
involved in, then much of the relevant content from the long course might be gleaned
without the time and monetary investment. OJT can be comprehensive and effective if
implemented correctly with a strong mentor. Furthermore, an ex-military graduate of test
pilot school who is expert in the handling qualities of high-performance aircraft may be
66

very well trained, but not the optimal person to conduct production flight test of a
corporate jet, for example. In this case, a 10,000 hour ATP might be the most appropriate
choice. A disciplined student who chooses the right source material (often generated by a
graduate of a test pilot school) can also develop the necessary skills and knowledge to
conduct effective flight tests, although this is very challenging.

Since the definition of training is so amorphous, it is better to refine our definition and
define professional flight test as flight test conducted for compensation by trained
personnel adhering to accepted flight test doctrine. It is both the training and the doctrine
that clearly separates professional from amateur flight test. An inexperienced, untrained
tester who simply follows the doctrine as a recipe is not a professional. Likewise, the
most well-trained test pilot who simply “kicks the tires and lights the fires” is also not a
professional. A competent individual or test team led by a competent individual
following accepted doctrine is performing professional flight test.

PROFESSIONAL FLIGHT TEST TRAINING AND DOCTRINE

Flight test doctrine varies slightly from organization to organization, but it can generally
be traced back to the curricula of the test pilot schools and universities and, equally
importantly, lessons learned during the execution of flight test. This is a circular and
symbiotic relationship, as the lessons learned are passed back to the test pilot schools and
universities via instructors who come to the schools from out in the industry as well as
through the numerous symposia. These lessons are then incorporated into the curricula.
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The curriculum changes then filter back down to the testers via the test pilot school
graduates and publications, many of which are the industry standard references. As the
test pilot schools are clearly the lynchpin of the flight test world, we will look more
closely at the long course curricula of the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Naval Test Pilot
Schools. The civilian National Test Pilot School follows a similar curriculum.

The two U.S military test pilot schools train three categories of students: Pilots, other
winged aircrew officers (USAF weapons systems officers (WSOs) and navigators and
USN naval flight officers (NFOs)), and flight test engineers. The two schools differ in
how they organize their students in that the USAFTPS keeps their students in a single
track while the USNTPS divides their students into three tracks: fixed wing, rotary wing,
and systems. USNTPS is responsible for training all U.S. military rotary wing pilots,
necessitating the rotary wing track. The USAF program is somewhat of a merger of the
USNTPS’s fixed wing and systems tracks. All USAF students are trained in performance,
flying qualities, and systems flight testing. At USNTPS, all NFOs are assigned the to the
systems track, which focuses less on flying qualities and performance testing and more
on radar, electro-optical, and electronic warfare systems test. FTEs are assigned to all
three tracks depending on their specialty. Both schools run two classes simultaneously,
staggered by approximately six months. USAFTPS’s long course runs 48 weeks, while
USNTPS’s is 10 months.

Both USNTPS and USAFTPS focus heavily on test management and reporting in
addition to flight test flying and data collection methods. USAFTPS dedicates over six
68

months to test management training and USNTPS spends 1/3 of the curriculum on and
provides 11 hours of formal instruction in reporting. Pilots at both schools are trained in
similar flying qualities and performance test techniques. At USNTPS, pilots fly progress
checks with instructors during which they must demonstrate that they have mastered the
techniques. FTEs fly similar progress checks with the instructor at the controls and must
demonstrate that they can act as test conductor and take meaningful data.

As mentioned before, nearly all flight test engineers are graduates of an accredited
engineering school. Although some may go on to graduate from one of the test pilot
schools or short courses, for many flight test engineers the only formal training that they
receive is during their undergraduate studies. Unfortunately, most graduates of a typical
aerospace or mechanical engineering program do not get any specialized flight test
training. Aerospace engineering curricula focus heavily on design, and the typical 4-5
year program is usually very time-constrained and has just enough time to cover the
fundamentals and include a strong design class, let alone a class that addresses flight test.
This is quite unfortunate, as flight test forces the individual to correlate actual aircraft
behavior with design characteristics. Not only would flight test coursework be directly
useful to those going into flight test, but it would also be a very powerful way to illustrate
the consequences of design decisions.

Unfortunately, there are several barriers to the widespread introduction of flight test
coursework in engineering institutions. Firstly, flight test is generally seen as a
specialized profession and, correctly, as one that only a small percentage of graduates are
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likely to be engaged in. Secondly, also as a result of the size of the flight test industry in
relation to the aerospace design industry, there are only a small number of people
qualified to teach such courses. An even smaller subset of this group has advanced
degrees, the lack of which is a concern to many competitive schools, as they use their
“percentage of faculty with advanced degrees” statistic as a marketing tool. Finally, an
effective flight test course generally requires the use of a real aircraft (or at least a highfidelity flight simulator) and a trained test pilot. Some schools, such as the University of
Tennessee Space Institute (UTSI) or Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University (ERAU)
have access to these resources, but most schools do not. Even schools that do offer such
courses typically charge students significant user fees to cover the very high costs of
operating aircraft and simulators. As a result, there are few universities that offer flight
test courses within their aeronautical / aerospace engineering curricula. In addition to
UTSI’s strong flight test program embedded in the Aviation Systems program, ERAU
offers a minor in Flight Test and Simulation. This minor includes a 3-credit course titled
“Intro to Flight Testing” which provides an overview of flight test planning, execution,
and reporting methods as well as risk management. The Western Michigan University
also offers a one semester class in flight test engineering which covers similar topics as
well as flights in an instrumented Cessna 182 to instruct students in in-flight data
collection. Southampton University in the United Kingdom includes a flight test course in
its aeronautical engineering program. This course also includes actual data collection
flights to give the engineering students and appreciation of in-flight data collection. As
with the other courses mentioned, it is focused on flying qualities and performance flight
testing.
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There are also several sources of short courses in flight test. Among these are the
University of Kansas and the National Test Pilot School, both of which are open to
civilians. Both schools offer a variety of courses, ranging from the University of Kansas’s
1-week Flight Test Principles and Practices course, which provides a general overview of
flight testing, to NTPS’s modular courses. The latter are actually components of the oneyear “long course” offered by NTPS. NTPS has, in the past, also offered to the general
public a course on homebuilt flight testing.

Both of the U.S. military test pilot schools also offer short courses. Generally considered
internal Department of Defense activities, is difficult for civilians other than those in the
employ of the U.S. DoD to take these courses (one reason is that the schools lack the
ability to easily accept money other than through intra-agency transfers). These courses
allow flight test engineers and oftentimes foreign military personnel to get abbreviated
portions of the year-long “long courses”. In addition, they offer short courses to fill in
gaps in the long course curricula such as unpiloted aerial vehicle (UAV) and turboprop
performance flight testing.

APPLICATION OF THE HFACS TO PROFESSIONAL FLIGHT TEST
METHODOLOGY AND THE REDUCTION OF FAILURES

Regardless of the weakness and inconsistencies illustrated above, the vast amount of
training that flight testers receive, whether formally or informally, provides various
defenses against failures (both active and latent) in the HFACS chain [11]. Training
affects all levels of the HFACS model. At the Organizational Influences level, having
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highly-trained (and uniformly-trained) personnel helps to provide a stable and healthy
structure. Authority can be effectively delegated as the one delegating the responsibility
has confidence in the abilities of his highly trained subordinate while that subordinate is
properly trained to accept the authority. The organization’s culture is governed by the
similar norms and rules and the team members have similar values and beliefs. All are
trained to follow the same operational procedures as well. Incorporated in all of this is the
improved level of communication between similarly trained personnel.

As one moves down through the layers of the HFACS, the role of training as a defense
against failures becomes more pronounced. At the Unsafe Supervision level, training
serves as protection against nearly every failure suggested by Wiegmann and Shappell.
Well-trained test team members are more likely to provide adequate supervision, plan
appropriate operations, and correct known problems. Operational doctrine, for instance, is
taught at the test pilot schools, which follow strict standard operating procedures and
operate strictly in accordance with test plans. Well-trained FTEs follow these practices
and provide correct data from which to plan operations. The trained test team analyzes
their proposed operations and has the knowledge to provide adequate crew rest and brief
times as well as appropriate crew for the mission. Formally-trained testers receive
instruction in crew resource management and operational resource management, allowing
them to more readily identify at-risk aviators or unsafe tendencies in aviators or general
practices. Although this alone cannot prevent the failure to correct a known problem, the
problems are more likely to be identified and corrected.
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Similarly, well-trained testers are less likely to put themselves in unsafe aircrew
conditions. A well-trained test pilot, for instance, is less likely to be distracted or
complacent. He is trained specifically not to allow his attention to become channelized
and to operate in a task-saturated environment. Part of test pilot training includes
simulated test flights with instructors evaluating the pilot’s performance. The test pilot
must fly with adequate precision while articulating his thoughts, remaining within the test
area, managing his fuel state, and avoiding traffic, just as he would in an actual test flight.
In addition to training affecting test pilots’ individual mental states, it also aids in their
crew resource management. Whether they are testing a multi-place aircraft, an aircraft
with an FTE or photographer onboard, an aircraft with communications to test team
members on the ground, or a combination of these crew configurations, the test pilot is
likely to be in a situation requiring effective crew resource management. The test pilot
schools specifically address this from the very beginning, as even practice flights begin
with a formal brief between the pilot and FTE. Furthermore, test pilots fly with multiple
FTEs and learn to communicate with a ground station, broadening their ability to
communicate with personnel of varying experience, abilities, and personality types under
different circumstances.

Finally, as previously addressed, the trained test pilot is less likely to commit the unsafe
act itself. Skill-based errors are less likely, as trained test pilots generally enter training
with a great deal of experience and then are specifically trained to carefully observe the
aircraft’s behavior while simultaneously flying with extreme precision. This is practiced
extensively in the test pilot schools and then evaluated in flight as described above. Poor
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decisions, such as misdiagnosing or responding incorrectly to an emergency, are less
likely when the pilot is well-trained and more comfortable in his environment in the first
place. Furthermore, violations are less likely among trained professionals. Test pilot and
FTE training emphasizes adherence to the brief, proper preparation, and remaining within
the aircraft’s cleared envelope. This training, couple with experience in operating in high
pressure situations, flying with extreme attention to the aircraft’s behavior, and overall
depth of knowledge of the aircraft’s characteristics and state give the professional test
pilot the tools required to develop the aforementioned “novel solution” when necessary to
avoid an accident.

Training is not the professional tester’s only source of defenses against failures. In both
the commercial and military sides of the aerospace industry, the typical flight test team
consists of, at a minimum, one test pilot and one flight test engineer. A single test pilot
can perform all of the duties required by a small test program himself, but he risks losing
objectivity when denied the system of checks and balances that is present with a second
test team member. Test teams are often much larger than the minimum - the test effort for
a new airframe with a complex mission, such as the U.S. Navy’s new P-8 maritime patrol
aircraft, might involve dozens of flight test engineers, discipline engineers, program
managers, and test pilots. In large test teams, each flight test engineer usually specializes
in a specific discipline. There are flying qualities specialists, aerodynamicists, propulsion
engineers, and systems engineers, for example. All are generally led by at test team lead
engineer and lead test pilot, both of whom report to the program manager.
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As projects narrow in scope, the size of the test team shrinks toward the minimum core of
a single pilot and engineer. This, of course, also creates additional responsibilities for the
test team members. The same pilot(s) and engineer(s) are required to perform every
aspect of the test program; initial test planning, safety review, development of test cards,
test execution, data reduction, and reporting are no longer performed by specialists.
Furthermore, the amount of overall experience in the test team is reduced, as test pilots
and flight test engineers vary greatly in experience. A larger team is more likely to have a
broader experience base. This is more important than the actual responsibilities levied
upon the members of a small test team and pertinent to the case of the homebuilder. As in
the aforementioned case of the single person (test pilot) homebuilt test team, the smaller
the team, the more difficult it is for the team members to maintain objectivity. External
pressures on the test program, such as budget and schedule, have a far greater chance of
overcoming the better judgment of two people than that of twenty. A larger group is more
likely to have experienced personnel who can identify a hazardous situation developing
while also having the confidence to call a halt to the program until the problem is solved.
It is also easier to simply neglect a mistake in the test plan or misread an otherwise
rational test plan when there are fewer test team members to review the document.

With respect to preventing failures within the context of the HFACS, this structure is
especially effective at the lower levels of Unsafe Acts and Unsafe Aircrew Conditions.
During test execution, unsafe acts such as the omission of checklist items or steps in a
procedure are prevented by the participation of the broad test team members. For
example, during a flight test conducted with an FTE on board or a ground-based test
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conductor monitoring the test, the pilot’s actions are backed up by the other test team
members. Decision errors such as misdiagnosis of an emergency or choosing the
improper procedure are also less likely with test team members watching over the pilot’s
shoulder. One anecdote recounts a test flight during which an F/A-18’s canopy was
inadvertently jettisoned. Based on the concussion of the pyrotechnic devices, the pilot
believed that he had lost an engine and began examining his engine instruments to
determine which engine had failed. Although not the case, had he begun to mistakenly
secure an engine, the propulsion expert monitoring engine parameters would have
informed him that his engines were functioning properly. In fact, it was the test
conductor, having observed the canopy jettison via an over-the-shoulder camera, who
diagnosed the emergency and prompted the test pilot to look up and see that he was now
flying an open-cockpit jet.

The broader test team’s participation also prevents what Shappell and Wiegmann refer to
as violations [11]. The testers are less likely to fail to adhere to the brief, fly unauthorized
maneuvers, or fail to properly prepare for the flight when they are all working together
and using their collective experience. As suggested above, in the case of a larger test
team, the test team provides a structure of checks and balances that serves to prevent
unsafe acts. These checks and balances also help to prevent failures associated with
unsafe aircrew conditions, the next level up in the HFACS model. Adverse pilot mental
states such as channelized attention and haste are mitigated by test team backup. Personal
readiness failures can also be detected more easily when the test pilot does not operate in
a vacuum.
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Interestingly, failures associated with crew resource management become more likely as
the test team grows in size, as there is a larger crew that must be properly led, briefed,
coordinated, and, most importantly, properly communicate within its membership. This
phenomenon can be observed at the higher levels of Unsafe Supervision and
Organizational Influences as well. Although an established supervisory and
organizational structure is generally beneficial, as it provides structure, guidance,
oversight, and training, all of these are places where failures can occur. This highlights
one of the fundamental aspects of aviation, and particularly flight test: risks can be
minimized and mitigated, but not eliminated. The very tools that testers (and all aviators,
to varying extents) use to keep themselves safe and efficient are still human endeavors
and therefore subject to failure.

Precise test planning, test execution, and reporting protocol are key elements of
professional flight test. Although they vary by test purpose, team size, and customer
requirements, these elements are all addressed in depth prior to the start of the test
program. All three are closely linked, as the team carefully plans and prepares to execute
the test so that the proper tests will be conducted and the proper data collected. The test
plan is written with the final report in mind. The tests are then executed strictly in
accordance with the test plan and with precision so that the data collected is of the highest
quality. Finally, the report is written using the data so that it satisfies the customer’s
requirements.
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A flight test program begins, in general, with the decision that flight test is required. In
the military, a program manager (usually with the assistance of flight test personnel) will
determine the requirements and scope of flight test and provide funding for the test
program. In the commercial world, the requirement for flight test is generally dictated by
the FARs. The test team then develops the test plan. Most organizations use the test plan
as a formal, governing document for the test program. Once signed by management, any
existing safety oversight board, and the test team members, it must be followed to the
letter. Any subsequent changes require an official amendment and subsequent review by
some or all of the original signatories. This type of strict organizational process helps to
prevent the types of failures associated with organizational influences in the HFACS.
With the program thoughtfully planned from the outset, time pressure and operational
tempo can be minimized.

The test plan is scoped to meet the test program’s specific requirements. A certification
test program for a commercially produced aircraft will be very involved, including tests
designed to satisfy all of the applicable FARs. The test plan is generally very detailed, the
intent being that the test team could execute a test program using only the test plan and its
references. This is very important – although it is highly unlikely that a new test team
would be called upon to execute a test from a completed test plan, it is very common that
a new test pilot or flight test engineer might join the team. If the test plan is
comprehensive, the new team member can study the test plan and immediately become
an effective participant in the test program. Another reason for this degree of detail in the
test plan is that most organizations use old test plans as templates for creating new ones.
78

In some cases, such as in production flight test, a team might be called upon to repeat an
entire test program almost exactly. In order to meet these needs, the test plan is generally
organized in a very formal manner. One section in the test plan that is critical to safety is
the test hazard analysis. In the test hazard analysis, the team lists hazards that may be
encountered during the test program. This list is compiled from knowledge gleaned from
careful analysis of the tests at hand, previous test programs, available literature, and test
team members personal knowledge. Each hazard is listed and analyzed individually. The
test team determines what might cause the particular hazard, under what conditions that
hazard is possible, what actions will be taken to mitigate the risk of the hazard occurring,
and what actions should be taken if the hazard is encountered. Finally, the likelihood of
the hazard occurring and the severity of the consequences are evaluated. The team will
then use a risk category matrix to assign a risk category to the hazard. This allows the
team to determine if the risk is acceptable and what qualifications the aircrew will need to
operate the aircraft in a regime where that hazard may be encountered. It is difficult to
imagine amateur testers having the knowledge or desire to conduct such a meticulous
examination of the risks associated with their test activities; however it is precisely this
methodology that professional testers use to identify, minimize, and mitigate risks.

In nearly all organizations, the test plan goes through a thorough review by the test team
leadership (e.g., project lead test pilot, project lead test engineer) and a review board of
some kind. The composition of this review board will vary widely depending on the type
of testing that is being conducted, but will usually include representatives of
management, test organization leadership, such as the chief test pilot or military test
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squadron commander, and discipline leadership, such as the head of the systems
development division in the case of testing a new flight system. Regardless of the
composition of the board, the members typically scrutinize the test plan page by page to
ensure that the test team has planned an appropriate and efficient test program and, most
importantly, that they have considered, addressed, and mitigated all foreseeable risks.
Some organizations require a series of test plan reviews as the plan is developed. The test
plan is typically signed before any ground testing commences, so often there is a first
flight readiness review prior to the commencement of the flight phase. These
organizational reviews are direct attempts to eliminate the latent failures at the Unsafe
Supervision and Organizational Influences levels in the HFACS. These reviews also
ensure that lessons learned from previous programs are disseminated to the test team.
Again, amateur testers do not benefit from any type or organizational review. In fact, the
FAA is typically not even interested in the details of any planned tests. They are
concerned only that the aircraft has been inspected, the flight test period is appropriate,
and that the test area is sufficiently unpopulated so as to protect the general public.

Once the test plan has been signed, the test execution phase begins. Prior to each test
event, the team, led in general by the test director or test conductor, will determine which
tests are to be conducted. One member of the test team will be designated as the test
conductor. Generally, the test conductor is an experienced tester who is knowledgeable
about the overall operation and systems of the aircraft. The test conductor is usually the
day-to-day leader of test execution. Once the tests to be conducted are determined, the
deck of test cards is prepared. Typically prepared in advance jointly by the discipline
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experts, test conductor, and test pilots, the test cards are excerpts from the test plan
printed on kneeboard cards for the aircrew. Each card will typically indicate the flight
condition and aircraft configuration at which the test is to be conducted; the test points
themselves, and any key factors that the aircrew must be concerned with (such as attitude
or engine limits, control input sequencing, or handheld data to be acquired). The cards
will also have spaces for the aircrew to write in handheld data. Ground crew members
will generally have the same cards printed out for them on regular paper with extra space
for additional notes. Finally, test cards usually indicate what the next test event is at the
bottom of the card.

The preflight test briefing is the place where all of the efforts of the test team come
together to actually execute the test safely and effectively. The briefing ties together the
test plan, the test cards, and the personnel and is designed to ensure that all team
members are approaching the test in a similar manner. At the briefing, test team members
(usually led by the test conductor) will go through a predefined list of topics, such as
weather, aircraft maintenance and instrumentation status, and range availability. The
team will then review each card and discuss how each event is to be conducted. Go-no
criteria, initial conditions, data requirements, and test methodology will all be discussed
so that the pilot (or pilots) and engineers all know exactly what to expect. Most
importantly, test hazards, especially those specific to the planned events, are reviewed
and emergency procedures are specifically briefed. In this way, the briefing is specifically
designed to avoid latent failures at several levels.
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A comprehensive brief also addresses many of the errors and violations categorized as
unsafe acts by the HFACS. Violations such as failure to properly prepare for the flight,
briefing an unauthorized flight, failing to be current or qualified for the mission, or
intentionally exceeding the aircraft (or, in this case, test) limits are all less likely when the
team comes together and reviews the strict requirements outlined in the test plan. Skillbased errors such as omitting checklist items, steps in (test) procedures, or poor technique
are also less likely when the checklists, procedures, and techniques are adequately
briefed. The likelihood of the pilot committing decision errors such as conducting
improper procedures, misdiagnosing or responding incorrectly to an emergency, or
conducting an inappropriate maneuver are also similarly reduced. HFACS actually
categorizes the failure to conduct an adequate brief as a latent failure in and of itself [11].

Following the flight, the test team reconvenes for a formal debriefing. Best described as
the photonegative of the preflight brief, the team again reviews the test event card-bycard and determines if any tests need to be repeated. Also discussed are the impacts of
any anomalies encountered on future test events. Any issues with the aircraft or
instrumentation are also discussed. Any required data reduction is determined and go/nogo criteria for the next event are established. In addition to determining whether the test
events can be considered complete, the team will determine if any deficiencies should be
noted (described in detail below).

Data reduction is as varied as test execution. A qualitative test may require only the
pilot’s debriefing and no quantitative data. On the opposite end of the spectrum is the
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structural test of a heavily instrumented aircraft, where electronic data from numerous
accelerometers and strain gauges must be analyzed via fast Fourier transform and studied
before any determination on data quality or test success can be made. In most cases,
however, engineers will study the test results prior to the next test event to ensure that the
team is safe to proceed. In addition to safety, poor test results might require that the test
be repeated.

The overall goal of any test program is to determine if the aircraft or system is
satisfactory. In the professional flight test world, any unsatisfactory performance or
characteristics are categorized as deficiencies. Deficiencies are formally categorized as
Part I, II, III, depending on their impact to the mission. The deficiency is also associated
with a general corrective action. Definitions of Part I, II, and III deficiencies and their
associated corrective actions follow:

Part I – Part I deficiencies preclude mission accomplishment and therefore must be
corrected as soon as possible. Sometimes, a Part I deficiency will force the test
program to stop until the deficiency is corrected.
Part II – Part II deficiencies degrade mission performance and therefore should be
corrected as soon as practicable. Generally, Part II deficiencies are characterized
by requiring the aircrew to develop a workaround the problem in order to
complete the mission.
Part III – Part III deficiencies are non-mission critical and should be avoided in future
designs. Part III deficiencies are usually considered nuisance deficiencies.

The corrective actions are deliberately vague and serve primarily as a guideline as to
when (rather than how) the deficiency should be corrected. Testers can also note
Enhancing Characteristics. These are unexpected positive characteristics (expected
characteristics would simply be noted as satisfactory) and are accompanied by the general
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recommendation that they “be included in future designs”. In a large, long-term test
program, deficiencies are often reported in small deficiency reports (DRs) so that they
may be addressed before the completion of the program. Specific recommendations from
the test team as to how to correct the deficiency would appear in the DR and/or in the
final report of test results (RTR).

The final deliverable of most professional test programs is the RTR itself. In a
developmental test program, the RTR can be hundreds of pages long, include numerous
plots and tables, be accompanied by several DVDs of digital data, and identify dozens of
deficiencies. As the debrief is, in many ways, a photonegative of the preflight brief, the
RTR is, in many ways, the test plan with all of the questions answered. The RTR
describes what tests were conducted, what methods were used, and what the test team
discovered. Furthermore, the RTR specifically relates these discoveries to the aircraft’s
mission. Like the test plan, an RTR is usually a very structured document. As the RTR is
the primary deliverable from the test program, it is intended to be a definitive record of
the program and its results. As such, it is typically reviewed at several levels prior to its
final presentation to the customer.

In most cases, the results of the flight test program must be delivered not only to
personnel who are relatively familiar with the test program, but also to those with only a
tangential knowledge of the testing, such as upper managers. As these people typically
lack the time to read a large, detailed report, some of the key pages are highlighted (in the
U.S. Navy, they are printed on blue paper). These include the summary, the summary of
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deficiencies, and the summary of specification compliance. A reader who peruses just
these three sections will gain a good understanding of the overall test results.

Professional flight test is a very deliberate, rigid process that has evolved via experience
and many safety lessons learned. Most professional testers “speak the same language”, as
they are influenced by the test pilot schools, which are in turn influenced by the needs of
and feedback provided by their clients. The test pilot schools themselves have exchange
programs for both students and instructors, so knowledge is shared between the schools
as well. The overall result is that professional flight test is very refined and designed to
safely and efficiently produce valuable test results and assessments.
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CHAPTER 6 – CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

CONCLUSIONS

Careful study of the current state of homebuilt flight test and the accident statistics as
well as a comparison of the methods used by builders conducting their own flight test and
those used by professional flight testers lead clearly to the following conclusions:

•

The homebuilt flight test industry is deficient and the accident rate is extremely
high.

•

The guidance available to homebuilders is insufficient and most homebuilders are
encouraged to perform flight test themselves, despite the fact that they are not
trained to do so and have few good resources to help them.

•

Close examination of the NTSB reports from 2002 to 2004 and the case studies
presented, illustrate how, in general, homebuilders are a classic example of
HFACS failures leading to an unsafe act.

•

Homebuilders, in general, compare poorly to their professional counterparts.
Whereas professional flight testers generally have years of training and thousands
of hours in varied aircraft, amateurs generally have no training and only limited
experience.

•

Compounding the problem is the quality of homebuilders’ experience – they
usually have limited time in the type of aircraft under test and only a limited
amount of experience in aircraft of different types to begin with. Whereas
professionals have training, a formal process, and a strong organizational structure
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which specifically address the challenges of flying a new, unknown aircraft,
amateurs have no safety net to protect them from these dangers. Many are
building their own airplane specifically to avoid regulations and oversight,
thereby willingly relinquishing several layers of protection that professional flight
testers enjoy. Furthermore, the independent spirit of many homebuilders leads
them to accomplish as many tasks as possible themselves, again placing the
dangerous task of flight test in the hands of an untrained, unsupervised amateur.

There are, of course, exceptions to this situation. Some homebuilders to identify their
limitations and choose to get professional assistance in the conduct of their flight test.
Others are actually well-qualified to conduct their own flight test (they, too understand
their limitations). Nevertheless, testers of homebuilt aircraft face the same problems that
professional flight testers do, but without many of the tools and training that their
professional counterparts have to mitigate the risks. As described earlier, the flight tests
prescribed by the FAA for homebuilt aircraft are vague – only the number of hours of
flight test required is specifically prescribed. What the tester does with the 25 or 40 hours
required is entirely up to him. Different aircraft have different test requirements - the
difficulty lies in determining those requirements, and amateurs generally do not have the
knowledge base to support this decision. Aside from the safety advantages that having a
trained test pilot bring to any test program, the ability to properly scope and plan a test
program is the most important advantage to having professional testers involved with the
flight test of homebuilt aircraft. A trained FTE could determine if a “production” type
flight test might be appropriate, such as in the case of a well-established kit like an RV-6,
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or a complete developmental flight test is required, such as in the case of a new or highly
modified design. The current situation is, however, somewhat bleak. The safety
information is available in the form of magazine articles and AOPA and NTSB reports,
but homebuilders either do not grasp the severity of the risks or choose to ignore them.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The safest solution to this problem is to have professionals conduct a larger portion of
homebuilt flight test, particularly in the cases of highly modified kitplanes, high
performance aircraft, or unique designs. These situations are of high enough risk that
amateurs should not be conducting the tests. Considering that the accident rates for
homebuilt aircraft include the relatively reliable RVs and other docile aircraft, the
number of accidents involving higher risk aircraft is even greater. Even with the more
docile aircraft, however, participation by professional flight testers would be extremely
beneficial. As we have seen, flight test of even the most docile aircraft is very dangerous
in the hands of an untrained, low time in type pilot.

Unfortunately, it is difficult to imagine homebuilders routinely hiring professionals as
either consultants or test pilots without wholesale changes in the way that homebuilt
flight test is mandated. This change in mandate could be either literally, such as with
changes in FAA requirements, or culturally, by changing what homebuilders consider to
be appropriate testing. The latter is of particular significance and far more likely to
happen, as the homebuilt culture is based on the principles of limited regulation, common
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sense, and self-policing. Although not optimal, simply increasing professional flight
testers’ influence on and participation in the testing of homebuilt aircraft would be an
enormous step toward eliminating some of the latent failures that make homebuilt flight
test so dangerous.

A first step toward the increased participation of professional flight testers in to the
homebuilt industry would be for the EAA and FAA to better educate builders on accepted
professional flight test practices. The AC90-89A [15] should be rewritten to focus not on
a listing of tests that will conveniently fill up 40 hours of flight testing, but rather a
methodology by which the builder can begin to assess the risks associated with his unique
test program and the data required for him to gather the necessary and appropriate
information about his unique airplane. Once the builder understands the flight test
phase’s dangers and requirements, he can then make an educated decision as to whether
or not he is prepared to act not only as test pilot, but as FTE or test team manager. Going
a step further, AC90-89A could go as far as stating that if the builder cannot truly
understand the associated risks or appropriate data to be collected, he should seek
professional assistance prior to the test planning stage.

If, at the very least, a professional approach is taken by the FAA toward homebuilt flight
test guidance, then a parallel professional approach to the flight test requirements is also
in order. The FAA should distinguish between “production” type flight test and
“developmental” type flight test. Much as the FAA certification office tailors the flight
test requirements for aircraft to be certified to the particular type in question, the FAA
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could determine into which category a particular homebuilder’s aircraft falls using
designated

airworthiness

representatives

(DARs)

and

designated

engineering

representatives (DERs). Considering factors such as the history of the design or kit, the
type and certification status of the powerplant, avionics installed, the builder’s experience
and education, and the DAR’s assessment, the DER could, for example, require only a 6hour “production” type test program for a basic, well-constructed kitplane with an
accepted, certified engine. This program would be focused on safety checks and
gathering data for the POH. Likewise, he could require a full 40-hour “developmental”
type test program for a plans-built aircraft with an unusual powerplant.

An additional benefit of having a DER make this assessment is that, by necessity, the
DER would have to be a flight analyst or flight test pilot - a professional tester. Thus, at
the very least, there would be a minimal amount of professional flight test influence on
the program. This would provide the builder with a valuable opportunity to actually meet
a flight tester and ask questions. The DER could brief the builder on the elements of the
HFACS and highlight elements of high risk. Furthermore, following the meeting, the
homebuilder might be led to more carefully consider his own capabilities with respect to
conducting flight tests, regardless of the DER’s determination of requirements. If the
additional costs associated with the DER and DAR’s time could not be absorbed by the
FAA, they could be accounted for through higher registration fees for homebuilders. The
latter would likely meet with some resistance from homebuilders and the EAA.
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It should be noted that the author is in no way suggesting that passengers be carried in the
first 25 hours of a homebuilt aircraft’s existence. It is only suggested that in many cases a
shorter test period may be appropriate. New aircraft should still be treated with a large
degree of caution, as some problems caused by defective or improperly installed parts
might not surface until subjected to the flight environment for a period of time. It might
be appropriate for the owner to receive transition training in this period, but flights should
be for the development of proficiency and limited to professional participants who are
well aware that the aircraft is still very new and that there are some potential risks.

Such required interaction with flight test professionals would likely lead to increased
discussion within the homebuilder community regarding greater professional
participation in the flight test process. Just as the EAA magazines are packed with articles
debating the merits of installing a particular piece of equipment, buying used or
overhauled engines, and factory builder-assist programs, dialogues regarding the cost vs.
benefits of hiring a flight test consultant or professional flight test team would likely
arise. Again, at the very least, homebuilders would be provided with an increased amount
of information as to how flight testing should be conducted. The frightening lack of
guidance that characterizes the current situation would begin to be ameliorated.

In conclusion, the greatest deficiency in the homebuilt flight test world is the absence of
the safeguards against the failures that threaten all aircraft operations and are particularly
acute in flight test. The most comprehensive way to correct this would be to require or
somehow convince builders that homebuilt aircraft be professionally flight tested.
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Professionals mitigate the risk of failures and are trained to plan and conduct an
appropriate suite of tests to satisfy the test requirements, whether they are mandated by
regulation or the customer. The balanced team of test pilots and FTEs provides a unique
system of checks and balances and differing points of view to help ensure that the test
program is safe and efficient. But requiring professional flight testing of homebuilt
aircraft is not realistic in the current culture of homebuilding. It is, however, conceivable
that some changes in the FAA’s guidance regarding homebuilt flight test could make
significant inroads into bringing professional flight test influence and participation to the
homebuilt flight test world. The additional step of tailoring flight test programs to
different types of homebuilt aircraft could move the industry even further toward this
goal. The overall result would be a community of homebuilders with a far greater
appreciation of the challenges of flight test, homebuilders with far more accurate
knowledge of their aircraft’s flying qualities and performance, homebuilders with a better
understanding of their aircraft’s (and their own) limitations, and, most importantly, a
reduced accident rate.
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